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COME DOWN AND MAKE BARGAINS
IN GOOD FAITH:
THE APPLICATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1981
TO RACE AND NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION IN RETAIL STORES
CHARLOTTE H. SANDERS*
Introduction
On a Saturday in July 2003, Samaad Bishop, an African
American, bought a doll set for his daughter at a Toys "R" Us store
in the Bronx, New York. As he was leaving the store, a security
guard approached and asked to see his receipt. Mr. Bishop initially
refused, asking why he had to show the receipt. The guard told
him, "store policy," and allegedly went on, "this is the Bronx, not
the suburbs and black people steal more than whites." Mr. Bishop
and the guard began to argue, and the guard pushed him back into
the store. During the argument, two white women exited the store
carrying Toys "R" Us bags without being asked for their receipts.
Mr. Bishop ultimately called the police and, when they arrived at
the store, showed them his receipt. He was then allowed to leave.
Mr. Bishop later sued Toys "R" Us under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and national
origin in contractual relationships.1 He lost.2 The court held that
* I thank the following people, all of whom have been instrumental in the production
of this article: Professors Joseph William Singer and Elizabeth Warren, who offered
invaluable feedback and guidance; the attorneys and staff of the Washington Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, where I first became acquainted with 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and the strange lack of remedy for people discriminated against in retail
stores; my family, who have provided unstinting support for all that I do; and James W.
Alexander, Jr., who is my partner and my touchstone.
1. The statute reads:
(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the
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once Mr. Bishop made his purchase, his contract with the store was
complete, and he had no rights under the statute. Though Mr.
Bishop made an adequate showing that the security guard had
discriminated against him on the basis of his race, whatever harm he
suffered fell outside § 1981's coverage. 3
Theresa McCrea's § 1981 race discrimination claims against
Saks, Inc. met a similar fate. 4 On Saturday, April 18, 1998, Ms.
McCrea, an African American, was shopping with her aunt and
young daughter at a Saks clothing store in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. A salesman approached her about her young
daughter's behavior, and he and Ms. McCrea began to argue. The
salesman then called security, telling them to "[g]et this nigger out."
Ms. McCrea, her daughter, and her aunt left the store without
purchasing the shirt they had planned to buy.
Ms. McCrea sued Saks, Inc. under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Like Mr.
Bishop, she lost. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court reasoned that the store did not infringe on any right protected
by § 1981 because it did not outright refuse to sell the shirt to Ms.
McCrea. Even though Ms. McCrea alleged that the salesman
discriminated against her and her family on the basis of their race,
they could not benefit from the statute's protection because they
were merely "harassed and discouraged." 5
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
(b) "Make and enforce contracts" defined. For purposes of this section, the
term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are
protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
2. Bishop v. Toys "R" Us-NY LLC, 414 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Mr.
Bishop also brought claims under state tort law, as well as under another portion of §
1981, the full and equal benefits clause. In addition, he asserted claims arising under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983. Though the court dismissed his § 1981 contract discrimination
claim, Mr. Bishop's § 1981 full and equal benefits claim, § 1983 claim, and state law
claims survived. The full and equal benefits clause of § 1981 is discussed further in Part
IV.B.1, infra.
3. Id. at 393.
4. McCrea v. Saks, Inc., No. 00-1936, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2,
2000). Ms. McCrea also sued Saks under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state
tort law. Like her § 1981 claim, the court dismissed both her Title II and state law claims.
5. Id.
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In Bishop and McCrea, the plaintiffs were accused and harassed
because they are African American. They were treated differently
from the white customers around them. However, customers like
Mr. Bishop and the McCrea family who have experienced
discrimination because of their race or national origin in retail stores
have few options for legal redress.6 The major federal public
accommodations statute, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does
not cover retail stores.7 In addition, while some state public
accommodations statutes explicitly ban discrimination in retail
stores,8 no such statute exists in Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas.9 In fact,
Mississippi and South Carolina's laws codify a retailer's right to
pick and choose among those who enter and receive service.1 0 As a
6. See Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping Mhile Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases
of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4 (2003). Professor Anne-Marie
G. Harris describes these claims by shoppers as "Consumer Racial Profiling," defined as
"any type of differential treatment of consumers in the marketplace based on race or
ethnicity that constitutes a denial or degradation in the product or service offered to the
consumer." She notes that "CRP can take many forms, ranging from overt or outright
confrontation to very subtle differences in treatment, often manifested in forms of
harassment. Outright confrontation includes verbal attacks, such as shouting racial
epithets, and physical attacks, such as removing customers from the store. Customer
harassment includes slow or rude service, required pre-payment, surveillance, searches
of belongings, and neglect, such as refusing to serve African-American customers."
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2006) (extending coverage only to any "establishment which
provides lodging to transient guests," "facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises," "place of exhibition or entertainment," and other
establishments within which a covered establishment is physically located or that is
physically within a covered establishment).
8. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 954(l) (2005) ("The term 'public accommodation,
resort or amusement' means any accommodation, resort or amusement which is open to,
accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but not limited to...
retail stores and establishments...."); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. 4112.01(9) (2005) ("'Place
of public accommodation' means any inn, restaurant, eating house, barbershop, public
conveyance by air, land, or water, theater, store, other place for the sale of merchandise,
or any other place of public accommodation or amusement of which the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges are available to the public.").
9. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1290 (1996). But see TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE § 11.611
(2005) (allowing revocation of a liquor license from a retailer convicted of violating "an
individual's civil rights or the discrimination against an individual on the basis of the
individual's race, color, creed, or national origin.").
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-620 (2005) ("Any person who, without legal cause or
good excuse, enters into the dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of
another person after having been warned not to do so or any person who, having
entered into the dwelling house, place of business, or on the premises of another person
without having been warned fails and refuses, without good cause or good excuse, to
leave immediately upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession
or his agent or representative shall, on conviction, be fined not more than two hundred
dollars or be imprisoned for not more than thirty days."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-17(1)
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result, many plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail
stores have turned to the contracts clause of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Section 1981, a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute,
guarantees to all people within the United States the same right "as
is enjoyed by white citizens" to "make and enforce contracts." Over
time, courts have changed the scope of § 1981, variously expanding
and restricting the statute's coverage. In 1991, Congress amended
the statute to extend its requirement of equality beyond the "making
and enforcement" of contracts to include in subsection (b) the
"performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship." However, many courts have continued to
apply the statute narrowly, despite the 1991 amendments that
broadened its scope.
This narrowing has occurred in two ways. First, some courts
have seemed simply to ignore the 1991 amendments, continuing to
focus solely on § 1981's "make and enforce" clause. In this view, a
shopper can state a claim under § 1981 only if he or she is clearly
blocked from "making" a contract. Shoppers who successfully
contract with retail stores, but on discriminatory terms and
conditions, and browsers who are deterred, but not completely
blocked from purchasing, can claim no § 1981 protection.
Second, even the courts that have made use of § 1981's
"privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions" clause have narrowed
the statute. These courts only accept as actionable those privileges,
benefits, terms, and conditions that have a direct impact on the
moment of purchase. Retailers' discriminatory acts against
shoppers before or after the exchange of money for goods fall
outside the statute, and those shoppers are left without a remedy.
This article examines and critiques courts' narrow
interpretations of § 1981 and offers a model for improved § 1981
decisionmaking. 11  Part I of the article traces the history and
(2005) ("[A retailer] is hereby authorized and empowered to choose or select the person
or persons he or it desires to do business with, and is further authorized and
empowered to refuse to sell to, wait upon or serve any person that the owner, manager
or employee of such public place of business does not desire to sell to, wait upon or
serve.").
11. Other commentators have made similar observations about courts' application of
§ 1981 in retail store cases. The analysis in this article builds on their observations, but
offers new critiques and proposes a new model for § 1981 decisionmaking. See Harris,
supra note 6 (examining § 1981 through the lens of a particular retail store discrimination
case); Deseriee A. Kennedy, Consumer Discrimination: The Limitations of Federal Civil
Rights Protection, 66 Mo. L. REV. 275 (2001) (examining courts' narrow interpretations of §
1981; Amanda G. Main, Racial Profiling in Places of Public Accommodation: Theories of
Recovery and Relief, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 289, 307 (2001) (reviewing § 1981 as one of many
possible ways to address "racial profiling" in retail stores); Abby Morrow Richardson,
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amendment of § 1981. Part II surveys post-1991 §1981 retail store
cases, focusing on the two ways in which courts have narrowed the
statute's coverage. Part III explains and critiques judges' § 1981
decisions. Finally, Part IV explores directions for an improved
application of § 1981 to claims of race and national origin
discrimination in retail stores.
I. The History and Amendment of § 1981
A. The Origins of § 1981
In December 1865, disturbed by reports that Southern whites
were recreating conditions of slavery for newly freed African
Americans through acts of private discrimination, Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois introduced a bill to "grant to the Freedmen
basic economic rights -to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be
sued, and to purchase and lease property." 12 Congress passed the
bill as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, pursuant to its power to enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery and involuntary
servitude. The Act radically extended the Thirteenth Amendment's
abolition of slavery into the realm of private economic relationships,
in compelling whites to "come down and make bargains in good
faith"13 and as equals with African-American freedmen. Indeed, in
the view of one member of the Congress that passed the 1866 Act,
the statute's reach into this previously protected world of private
contractual relations was "absolutely revolutionary." 14
The language of today's 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was originally part of
Senator Trumbull's Civil Rights Act of 1866. At the time of its
passage, the relevant section of the Act read:
Applying 42 U.S.C. 1981 to Claims of Consumer Discrimination, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 119
(2005); (focusing also on issues of consumer credit and patterns of shopping and
consumption); Singer, supra note 9 (focusing on the property law implications of § 1981
when applied to retail stores; proposing changes to the common law to eliminate
retailers' right to exclude).
12. Barry Sullivan, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Historical Reconstruction,
Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 550, 552
(1989).
13. Id. at 555 n.96 ("The old master was not inclined to treat them differently from
what he did when they were slaves.... The old planters were very unwilling to come
down and make bargains in good faith." (citing H.R. REP. NO. 30, 39th Cong. 1st Sess.,
pt. iv, at 116) (1866)).
14. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 547 n.38 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1291 (1866) (Sen. Morrill)).
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[C]itizens of the United States ... of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude... shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 15
In 1870, Congress reenacted this provision of the 1866 Act
pursuant to the newly passed Fourteenth Amendment. Congress
then split the provision into two sections within the Revised Statutes
of 1874, which ultimately became today's 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
concerning the right to contract, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, concerning
the right to purchase, hold, and sell real and personal property. 6
Early cases applied the legislation's bar on race-based denials of
contract and property rights to common carriers. In Coger v. North
Western Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 147-49 (1873), the Iowa
Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act prohibited a steamboat from
reserving a first class table for white passengers and excluding a
female schoolteacher who was one quarter African American.17
Discussing the Act, the court commented, "The language is
comprehensive and includes the right to property and all rights
growing out of contracts. It includes within its broad terms every
right arising in the affairs of life."' 8
Similarly, sixteen years later, in Gray v. Cincinnati Southern R.
Co., 11 F. 683 (Ohio, 1882), an Ohio court held that the "civil rights
bill" guaranteed an African-American woman the right to a seat in
the class of train car for which she had bought a ticket.19 The
plaintiff had purchased a first class ticket, but was instead directed
to the smoking car. The court analogized the situation to the denial
of a seat to a male passenger, remarking, "The gentleman's money is
just as good as the lady's, in the eye of the law, and they are bound
to provide for him such reasonable accommodations as he has paid
15. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2006)).
16. For the text of the 1874 versions of the statute, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 424 (1968).
17. Coger v. North Western Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 147-49 (1873) (describing
the plaintiff's identity as a "quadroon' and noting that "by her spirited resistance and
her defiant words, as well as by her pertinacity in demanding the recognition of her
rights and in vindicating them, she has exhibited evidence of the Anglo-Saxon blood
that flows in her veins").
18. Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
19. Gray v. Cincinnati S. R. Co., 11 F. 683 (Ohio, 1882).
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and contracted for."20 With regard to the plaintiff herself, the court
found that, "[w]hatever the social relations of life may be, before the
law we all stand upon the broad plane of equality. And this
company was bound to provide for this colored woman precisely
such accommodations, in every respect, as were provided upon
their train for white women."21
There is also evidence, however, that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 was limited in its ability to reach far into the realm of private
economic choice. After the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
invalidated a separate federal public accommodations law in 1883,
courts' interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 became
correspondingly narrow.22 For example, in Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa
536 (1885), the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the right of skating
rink owners to refuse to sell a ticket to an African-American man on
the basis of his race, despite advertisements that the rink was open
to the public:
The act complained of by plaintiff was the withdrawal by
defendants as to him of the offers which they had made to admit
him, or to contract with him, for admission. They had the right to
do this as to him, or any other members of the public. This right,
as we have seen, is not based upon the fact that he belongs to a
particular race, but arises from the consideration that neither he,
nor any other person, could demand, as a right under the law,
that the privilege of entering the place be accorded to him. 23
Though the plaintiff's complaint focused on his right to make a
contract, rather than his right to enter the skating rink as a place of
public accommodation, the court imported the narrow reasoning of
the Civil Rights Cases and dismissed the plaintiff's contract-based
claim.
Thus, while some early courts vigorously enforced § 1981's
guarantee of equal contract rights to African Americans, others
refused to challenge the very private acts of discrimination that had
20. Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, a group of five
consolidated cases that implicated the constitutionality of the public accommodations
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the United States Supreme Court struck down
portions of the Act that prohibited discriminatory acts by individuals, rather than by
state or federal government. In a decision that sharply constrained Congress' power to
address the problem of discrimination through federal legislation, the Court reasoned
that neither the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery nor the Fourteenth
Amendment's proscription of discrimination by the states authorized passage of a law
that reached private acts of discrimination by non-governmental parties.
23. Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 540 (1885) (emphasis added).
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troubled Senator Trumbull. Despite cases like Bowlin, § 1981
remained law, and continued to be a source of protection for many
African Americans who had been discriminated against by common
carriers and in public accommodations. 24 However, the question of
the statute's revolutionary reach into what had previously been the
shielded realm of private contractual relations has remained in
dispute into modern times.
B. The Modern History of § 1981
The modern history of § 1981 can be traced to a 1968 Supreme
Court decision, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
While early cases brought pursuant to Senator Trumbull's Civil
Rights Act concerned race discrimination on common carriers and
in places of public accommodation, in Jones, the Court faced the
question of whether § 1982, § 1981's companion statute, barred
"purely private discrimination" in a white owner's sale of a home to
an African-American family.25 The Court examined the twin
histories of § 1981 and § 1982, noting Congress' fear in 1866 that
private "custom or prejudice" might infringe on African Americans'
property rights.26 In a departure from its earlier, limited view of
Congressional power in the Civil Rights Cases, the Court determined
that § 1982's prohibition of race discrimination in the purchase and
sale of real and personal property extended to private
discriminatory acts. "We hold that § 1982 bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of
the power of Congress .... " 27
In 1974, the Court turned from § 1982 to the question of § 1981's
application to private acts of discrimination. In Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976), African-American families sued whites-only
private schools under § 1981, and the schools argued that the statute
did not apply to private actors.28 The Court observed that the
schools had advertised and offered their services to members of the
general public, but then refused to serve white and nonwhite
24. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1378-82.
25. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 419 (1968) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 423.
27. Id. at 413. See also id. at 413 n.5 ("Because we have concluded that the
discrimination alleged in the petitioners' complaint violated a federal statute that
Congress had the power to enact under the Thirteenth Amendment, we find it
unnecessary to decide whether that discrimination also violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
28. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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students equally.29 Citing Jones, the Runyon Court applied § 1981's
contracts clause to the schools' discriminatory refusal to deal,
stating:
The petitioning schools and school association argue principally
that § 1981 does not reach private acts of racial discrimination.
That view is wholly inconsistent with Jones' interpretation of the
legislative history of § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, an
interpretation that was reaffirmed in [later Supreme Court
cases] ... And this consistent interpretation of the law necessarily
requires the conclusion that § 1981, like § 1982, reaches private
conduct.30
By 1974, therefore, the Supreme Court had interpreted both §
1982 and the contracts clause of § 1981 broadly, allowing the
statute's protection to reach the "pervasive and entrenched private
discrimination" that the 1866 Act was written to combat.31
C. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
In 1989, the Supreme Court reversed course in its interpretation
of § 1981 and § 1982. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989), an African-American employee brought suit under §
1981, claiming that her employer had harassed her (including
commenting that "blacks are known to work slower than whites"),
failed to promote her, and then terminated her.32 Though the Court
upheld Runyon's broad application of § 1981 to private
discriminatory acts, it adopted an extremely narrow view of the
phases of the employment relationship covered by the statute. The
Court stated:
The most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its scope
to forbidding discrimination in the "mak[ing] and enforce[ment]"
of contracts alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does
not involve the impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981
provides no relief. Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general
proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations,
for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and
enforcement of contracts.33
29. Id. at 164-65.
30. Id. at 173.
31. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 552.
32. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178 (1989).
33. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
Spring 2007]
HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL
According to the Court, the harassment and discrimination that
the plaintiff suffered fell outside § 1981's coverage because it took
place after the initial formation of the employment contract. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court first located a time period in
which it determined "contract formation" to have occurred, and
then drew a bright line between the "formation" and
"postformation" phases of the employment relationship. Relying on
this distinction, the Court held:
[T]he right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either
logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the contract
relation has been established, including breach of the terms of the
contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions.
Such postformation conduct does not involve the right to make a
contract, but rather implicates the performance of established
contract obligations and the conditions of continuing
employment.. .. 34
Though he concurred with the majority in upholding Runyon,
Justice Brennan dissented vigorously from its narrow reading of the
statute. Joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun and in part by
Justice Stevens, Justice Brennan attacked the Court's formalism,
accusing the majority of applying the statute in a manner
"antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which contractual
opportunities are equal."35 Rather than ending the § 1981 inquiry at
the bright line marking the edge of "contract formation," Justice
Brennan viewed discriminatory postformation conduct as evidence
that the initial contract had been made on unequal terms.36 As an
example, he offered the scenario of an employer extending the same
employment contract to African-American and white applicants, but
telling the African-American applicant, "there's a lot of harassment
going on in this workplace and you have to agree to that."37 The
Patterson plaintiff, he maintained, suffered the same harm as the
fictional African-American applicant, and "in neither case can it be
said that whites and blacks have had the same right to make an
employment contract."38
In a footnote, Justice Brennan offered a second way in which
34. Id. at 177.
35. Id. at 189 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
36. Id. at 207 ("[T]he language of § 1981 is quite naturally read as extending to cover
postformation conduct that demonstrates that the contract was not really made on equal
terms at all.").
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id.
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postformation discriminatory conduct would fall within § 1981's
coverage. He recognized that postformation race discrimination
against a contracting party might deter other members of that
party's race from even beginning negotiations in the first place. He
stated, "when a person is deterred, because of his race, from even
entering negotiations, his equal opportunity to contract is denied as
effectively as if he were discouraged by an offer of less favorable
terms." 39
Justice Stevens also wrote separately, challenging the notion
that an employment contract exists only at a single moment and is
susceptible to clear demarcation at its borders. Noting that an at-
will employee is "constantly remaking [his or her] contract," he
argued that, "if, after the employment relationship is formed, the
employer deliberately implements a policy of harassment of black
employees, it has imposed a contractual term on them that is not the
'same' as the contractual provisions that 'are enjoyed by white
citizens. '"' 40 To Stevens, the majority's view of "contract" as a
discrete event capable of being pinpointed at one moment in time
ignored contracts' true identity as "evidence of a vital, ongoing
relationship between human beings." 41  However, despite the
Brennan and Stevens opinions, the Patterson majority's narrow
interpretation of the statute was binding, and § 1981 could be
applied only to discrimination that took place at the discrete
moment of contract formation.
D. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Three years later, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress overruled Patterson, along with six other Supreme
Court decisions that had interpreted civil rights laws narrowly. 42
The Act amended § 1981 to broaden its coverage beyond the making
and enforcement of contracts, specifically repudiating the Patterson
majority's cramped reading of the statute. Comments from the
legislative history of the 1991 Act reveal the sentiment that "[t]he
39. Id. at 209 n.13.
40. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
41. Id.
42. See Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L. REV. 1, 99 n.96 (1992)
(noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned six Supreme Court opinions in
addition to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union and identifying the six cases as Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), Lorance v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), West Virginia University Hospital v. Casey,
499 U.S. 83 (1991), and E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244 (1991)).
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Patterson decision [had] sharply cut back on the scope and
effectiveness of section 1981 ... [with] profoundly negative
consequences both in the employment context and elsewhere." 43
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
identified "a compelling need for legislation to overrule the
Patterson decision and ensure that federal law prohibits all race
discrimination in contracts." 44 Congress therefore added subsection
(b) to the statute, defining "make and enforce contracts" to include
"the making, performance, modification, and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions of the contractual relationship." Congress also added
subsection (c), which states, "The rights protected by this section are
protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination
and impairment under color of State law." This section codified
Runyon's application of § 1981 to acts of private discrimination.
Finally, though not explicitly mentioned in the amended statute,
Congress approved of a Supreme Court decision, St. Francis College
v. Alkhazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1986), which applied § 1981 not only to
race discrimination, but to discrimination on the basis of national
origin as well.45
Since the 1991 amendments, the plain language of § 1981 has
provided far-reaching protection against private acts of race and
national origin discrimination in contractual relationships. Yet
despite Congress' broadening of the statute, many courts continue
to apply it narrowly to claims of discrimination in retail stores,
focusing only on the "make and enforce" clause or limiting the
actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions in subsection
(b) to those that have a direct impact on the moment of purchase.46
43. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. I, at 87, 89 (1991).
44. S. REP. No. 101-315, at 12 (1990).
45. St. Francis College v. Alkhazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1986); see also 137 CONG. REC.
S15472, S15486 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Statement of Rep. DeConcini) ("The Court in St.
Francis College demonstrated that when Congress enacted this statute it intended to
protect from discrimination a wide variety of groups that were then considered racial
groups but are now considered national origin or ethnic minority groups. Characteristics
that identify national origin groups are ethnic characteristics such as language, speech
accent, culture, ancestry, birthplace, and certain physical characteristics.").
46. See, e.g., Baltimore-Clark v. Kinko's, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 695, 699 (D. Md. 2003)
(internal citations omitted) ("Courts, including this one, that have examined
discrimination in the retail context under § 1981 have focused on the question of
whether a plaintiff's right to contract has been impeded, thwarted, or deterred in some
way, ... or whether special conditions have been placed on a plaintiff's right to
contract.").
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II. Courts' Double-Narrowing of § 1981
A. The Conception of Contract in Post-1991 § 1981 Retail Store
Cases
Before examining the two ways in which courts after the 1991
amendments have narrowed § 1981, it is important to note the
concept of contract that lies beneath those courts' restricted readings
of the statute. The right to equal treatment that § 1981 confers is not
free-standing, but is rather tied to an underlying contractual
relationship. The Courts' view of that underlying contract
influences their § 1981 jurisprudence. Though very few courts
actually perform a contract law analysis in their § 1981 retail store
decisions, one can imagine courts asking two preliminary questions
at the outset of their § 1981 analyses: When is a retail contract made,
and what is a retail contract for?
In response to the first question, a court could mark the
beginning of the retail contractual relationship at multiple points.
The relationship might be created by a shopper's entry into a retail
store, signifying his or her "acceptance" of the store's "offer" of
goods. Alternatively, the contractual relationship might begin when
a customer locates the items for which he or she was looking, and
end when he or she purchases those goods.
In § 1981 retail cases, however, courts have almost universally
defined the contractual relationship between customer and retailer
as both beginning and ending with the exchange of money for
goods. Retail contracts come to resemble the Patterson majority's
discrete, cabined employment contract, rather than Justice Stevens'
"vital, ongoing relationship between human beings." 47 As the Fifth
Circuit has stated, "A contract for employment involves a
continuing contractual relationship that lasts for the duration of the
agreement.... [I]n the retail context, by contrast, there is no
continuing contractual relationship. Instead, the relationship is
based on a single discrete transaction-the purchase of goods."48
The contract is a moment, rather than a process, and the "making
and enforcement" of a contract happen simultaneously at the point
of purchase. As a result, when post-1991 courts limit § 1981's
coverage to contracts' "making and enforcement," they also confine
47. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
48. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 360 (5th Cir. 2003).
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its protections to the point of purchase, the moment when a
customer exchanges money for goods and the contract is both made
and enforced.
Courts have answered the second question-a retail contract's
content-by refusing to view the contract as a bargain for much
more than the goods sold. In other types of § 1981 cases, such as
claims brought against restaurants, courts have read the contract as
encompassing services as well as goods. 49 In the retail store context,
though some courts have recognized that § 1981's subsection (b)
requires equality in a retail contract's privileges, benefits, terms, and
conditions, this recognition has not translated into a consideration of
many terms and conditions beyond the goods themselves. Instead,
courts have generally accepted only those privileges, benefits, terms,
and conditions that are tightly linked to the point of purchase, and
have refused to examine services provided prior to or following that
moment. Given the option to view services as well as goods as part
of a retail contract, courts have adopted a limited view of the
contracts' content, confining the bargain to the goods exchanged for
money.
The two ways in which courts have narrowed § 1981 -focusing
exclusively on the "make and enforce" clause and acknowledging
only a few actionable privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions
under subsection (b)- are thus based on a correspondingly limited
view of the duration and content of the contract between customer
and retailer. An examination of courts' post-1991 § 1981
jurisprudence reveals both courts' double-narrowing of the statute
and the restricted view of retail contracts on which it is based.
B. The "Make and Enforce" Clause
Post-1991 courts' first method of narrowing § 1981 in retail store
cases has been to limit its coverage to only the "making and
enforcement" of contracts, the core of § 1981 in its pre-1991 form.
For these courts, a successful § 1981 claim involves the complete
denial of a shopper's right to "make" a contract in the form of a
retailer's outright refusal to deal. In retail settings, an outright
refusal comes in several forms: a store barring a customer's entry,
asking a customer to leave, or refusing to complete a customer's
transaction at or near the checkout counter. In the pre-1991
Patterson-era, this type of claim represented the archetypal § 1981
retail store case, and courts easily identified violations of those
49. Cases challenging discrimination in restaurants under § 1981 are discussed
further in Part III.B.2, infra.
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customers' rights to "make and enforce" retail contracts.50 Even
after Congress' repudiation of Patterson in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, some courts have continued to limit the statute's coverage to
cases involving outright refusals to deal. This narrowing of the
statute is evident in courts' reasons for dismissing some § 1981 cases
and for letting others stand, policing the boundaries of this "core"
category of cases.
In Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003), Latino
plaintiffs successfully purchased gas, but then abandoned their
attempt to purchase beer when a clerk addressed them with racial
epithets. In upholding the dismissal of their § 1981 claim, the Fifth
Circuit identified a "rule" that, "where a customer has engaged in
an actual attempt to contract that was thwarted by the merchant,
courts have been willing to recognize a § 1981 claim."51 Because the
plaintiffs bought gas and then "voluntarily" abandoned the beer
purchase, they did not satisfy this "rule," as they failed to make the
core showing of an outright refusal to contract.
Though the outcomes are different, courts have employed
similar reasoning in allowing other claims to stand. In Christian v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit
allowed the plaintiff's § 1981 claim to proceed, but only because she
was able to state a claim that fell within the court's limited view of
the statute. The Christian plaintiff, an African American, was
accused of shoplifting and asked to leave a store by police, requiring
her to abandon a shopping cart full of merchandise. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff "had selected merchandise to
purchase, had the means to complete the transaction, and would, in
fact, have completed her purchase had she not been asked to leave
the store."5 2 The court remarked that the case "involve[d] none of
the difficulties that other courts have encountered in determining
whether there was a valid contract interest at stake."5 3  The
50. See, e.g., Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990)
(holding that an ejection of African Americans from a club and refusal to serve them was
a case of outright refusal to contract in the form of a request to leave the premises);
Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, 710 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (denying motion
to dismiss to a retailer who falsely told African-American plaintiffs that his store was
closed or that they had to have an airline ticket to enter, despite no § 1981 analysis, and
focusing instead on the question of whether the retailer's actions were discriminatory,
thereby implicitly accepting the plaintiffs' claim of a core § 1981 violation in the store's
blocking of their entry).
51. Id. at 358; see also Morris v. Dillard's Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir.
2001) (requiring the plaintiff to show "evidence of some tangible attempt to contract
with Dillard's during the course of the ban, which could give rise to a contractual duty
between her and the merchant, and which was in some way thwarted").
52. Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 874 (6th Cir. 2001).
53. Id. Courts have identified discrimination at the point of purchase, and therefore
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plaintiff's claim fell within the core of § 1981's coverage because she
could show the type of "thwarting" of her contract rights that the
Fifth Circuit demanded in Arguello.
Post-1991 courts' treatment of § 1981 claims brought by
browsers in retail stores further illustrates their reluctance to extend
the statute's protections in the absence of an explicit refusal to deal.
These courts have generally dismissed browsers' claims on the
ground that they can show no intent to purchase, and therefore no
core right to "make and enforce" a contract. For example, in Morris
v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit
upheld the dismissal of claims by browsers discriminatorily accused
of shoplifting because the plaintiffs "were neither denied admittance
nor service, nor were they asked to leave the store."M
The Arguello and Office Max plaintiffs' shopping experiences
were surely modified when they endured racial epithets or were
discriminately accused of shoplifting. However, the courts that
rejected their claims disregarded the statute's expanded form,
have extended § 1981's coverage. See, e.g., Burgin v. Toys-R-Us, No. 97-CV-0998E, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10073 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 1999) (finding discrimination where store
employees used racial epithets, returned plaintiffs' money they had already tendered,
and removed them from the store); Shen v. A&P Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21404 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1995) (finding discrimination where plaintiffs
alleged that a retailer refused to sell them groceries because they were Chinese
American, shouting "Go back to China"); Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394
F.3d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding discrimination where an African American was
refused service on his car and told, "Niggers always want something for nothing" and
citing Arguello in characterizing the plaintiff's claim as a classic § 1981 violation, a
situation in which "a merchant denies service or outright refuses to engage in business
with a consumer attempting to contract with the merchant").
54. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1996). Courts have also
analyzed claims by browsers as if the plaintiffs were asserting an open-ended right to
make future contracts, arguing that present discrimination by retailers has deterred
them or others from entering into these future contracts. Though Justice Brennan
suggested this very reading of § 1981 in Patterson, courts have not recognized such a
right under § 1981, and have dismissed browsers' claims as falling outside the core
coverage of the statute. See, e.g., Turner v. Fashion Bug, No. 99-3174, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 32576, at *6-7 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 1999) (" [The plaintiff] had nothing in hand that he
intended to purchase, and had nothing in particular in mind that he intended to buy.
The fact that Turner may have made a purchase if he had found something he wanted to
buy does not amount to a present intent to enter into a contract."); Evans v. Harry's
Hardware, No. 01-1276, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16606, at *5-6 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 2001)
("[Blare allegations of a 'deterrence' from purchasing goods, 'constructive refusal' of
service, or interference with a prospective contractual relation (without the allegation of
an actual loss of a contractual interest) are speculative and insufficient to state a claim
under § 1981."); Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 983 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(dismissing case because plaintiff had not located the air rifle cartridges he was looking
for, he had not shown that he was actually going to contract with the store). But see
Ackerman v. Food-4-Less, No. 98-CV-1011, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813 (E.D. Pa. June 10,
1998) (upholding a claim by a browser).
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clinging instead to a pre-1991 view of the core and limits of the
statute's coverage. In fact, the Arguello court explicitly rejected the
plaintiffs' attempts to claim coverage under subsection (b),55
characterizing the contractual relationship formed between
customer and retailer as "based on a single discrete transaction -the
purchase of goods" and holding subsection (b) inapplicable to a
retail setting.5 6
As illustrated by Christian, plaintiffs whose claims fall within
the statute's core, who have experienced a retailer's outright refusal
to deal and lost their right to "make and enforce" a contract, will be
protected by § 1981. Yet many plaintiffs who cannot show a
discriminatory outright refusal to contract have no opportunity for
redress under the statute.
C. The "Privileges, Benefits, Terms, and Conditions" Clause
Though some courts have ignored subsection (b) and limited §
1981's reach to cases in which plaintiffs have been blocked from
"making and enforcing" contracts, others have tentatively embraced
the subsection and allowed claims in which a contract is formed, but
with unequal privileges, benefits, terms, or conditions. Examples of
these cases include those brought by customers who have been
subjected to racial slurs at the point of purchase or who have been
required to pre-pay or pay by certain methods. These customers all
completed their purchases, and thus were not blocked from
"making and enforcing" a retail contract. However, because the
contractual moment was altered on the basis of race or national
origin, courts have been willing to find violations of § 1981 under
subsection (b). Though at first glance these courts seem to be
widening the reach of § 1981 beyond cases such as Arguello and
Office Max, their analyses in fact represent a second narrowing of the
statute, because the terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits they
have recognized are limited only to those discriminatory acts that
have a direct impact on the contractual moment.
An example is Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms Dairy Inc., 78 F. Supp.
2d 479 (D. Md. 1999), in which an African-American plaintiff
attempted to make a purchase from a convenience store cashier.
55. Other plaintiffs may not have pled subsection (b), but courts would not be bound
by this omission, as subsection (b), as written, is a definition of the term "make and
enforce contracts" in subsection (a). Courts would therefore be free to draw on
subsection (b) in their analyses, and would not be limited by plaintiffs' pleading.
56. Arguello v. Conoco, 330 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2003).
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That cashier made racial slurs and refused service.5 7 After some
delay, a second cashier completed the sale. The court held that the
combination of the delay and the racial slurs constituted an
alteration in the contract's terms and conditions sufficient to give
rise to a § 1981 claim.58
Similarly, in Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Ill.
1999), African-American, but not white, customers were required to
pre-pay for gasoline. In refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs' case, the
court explicitly rejected the defendant's attempts to confine § 1981's
protections to refusal-to-deal cases. Foreshadowing the Fifth
Circuit's Arguello decision, the defendant argued that "because
plaintiffs were admitted into the gas stations and ultimately were
able to purchase gas, there has been no tangible deprivation of
rights protected by § 1981 ... ."59 The court disagreed and held that
the discriminatory pre-payment requirement "adversely affected the
basic terms and conditions of [the plaintiffs'] contract to purchase
gasoline from Shell-brand stations." 60  Essential to the court's
analysis was the timing of the discrimination "at the point of sale,
directly implicating plaintiffs' right to contract and to enjoy 'all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship."' 61 The court recognized a § 1981 violation in the
imposition of discriminatory contractual terms and conditions.
However, the court narrowed its analysis by tethering the terms and
conditions claim to the concept that a retail contract exists only at
one moment, the point of sale.
In Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 730 (D.
Md. 2001), the court accepted as actionable similar discrimination at
the point of sale. In that case, a chain of toy stores maintained a
policy of refusing African-American customers' personal checks. The
court held that, though the plaintiffs were ultimately successful in
making purchases, the no-check policy violated § 1981's terms and
conditions clause. Analogizing the case to Hill v. Shell Oil Co., the
court stated, "the defendants placed a special condition on Plaintiffs'
right to contract... [flurther, both sets of plaintiffs alleged that the
respective defendants' discriminatory policies adversely affected the
57. Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms Dairy, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482-83 (D. Md.
1999).
58. Id. at 485 ("Although Williams was eventually able to purchase items from
another cashier, the Court refuses to find that this delay in completing the transaction,
coupled with the alleged racial attack, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a
violation of § 1981.").
59. Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 764, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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basic terms and conditions of their contract to purchase merchandise." 62
When discrimination occurs prior to or following the point of
sale, however, many courts have refused to acknowledge a § 1981
subsection (b) claim. Trailing a customer through a store before
completing a purchase would appear clearly to violate § 1981's
"terms and conditions" clause. This and similar forms of pre-
purchase discrimination, however, do not occur at the moment of
purchase, so courts have dismissed these claims.63 Using similar
reasoning, courts confronted with cases of post-purchase
discrimination have also nearly uniformly declined to extend §
1981's coverage, maintaining that the customer's rights vis-a-vis the
store end with the completion of the purchase. 64 Analytically, these
62. Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (D. Md. 2001)
(emphasis added). See also Buchanan v. Consol. Stores Corp., 217 F.R.D. 178 (D. Md.
2003) (granting summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that they had
advanced a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their no-check policy and that the
plaintiffs had failed to show that this reason was pretext).
63. See, e.g., Jeffery v. Home Depot, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (S.D. Ca. 2000)
(refusing to extend § 1981 protection to a plaintiff whose bag was searched prior to
purchase; stating, "even if the search request was racially motivated, § 1981 would still
not provide a statutory basis for a remedy in this case because Jeffery cannot prove
interference with a contract right"). Cf. Lewis v. Commerce Bank & Trust, No. 034218,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6477, at *6 (D. Kan. March 15, 2004) (dismissing claim of African-
American plaintiff about whom a bank circulated a video of the plaintiff's transaction
and a memorandum describing him as a likely bank robber; "It is not alleged that racial
profiling or racially motivated surveillance interfered with defendant's ability to make
and enforce contracts."). But see Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, 264 F. Supp. 2d 945, 948 (D. Or.
2003) (holding a bank's delay in check-cashing and requirement that an African-
American customer remove his sunglasses to be an actionable contract term or condition
under § 1981).
64. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2001)
("[O]nce the purchase is completed, no contractual relationship remains."); Thomas v.
Trotter, No. 04-0672, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 292 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2006) (same); Chu v.
Gordmans, Inc., No. 01-182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26623 (D. Neb. Apr. 12, 2002) (same);
Rogers v. Elliott, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1314-15 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (same); Hickerson v.
Macy's Department Store at Esplanade Mall, No. 98-3170, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3244
(E.D. La. March 16, 1999) (same); Thomas v. National Amusements, Inc., No. 98-71215,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5188, at *8 (E.D. MI Feb. 24, 1999) (citing Patterson for the
proposition that "conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and which does
not interfere with the right to enforce established contractual obligations" is not
actionable under § 1981); Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, No. 96-8262, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3570, at *14 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs' contention "that they were
denied the right to enjoy all the terms, benefits and privileges of an implied contract
between a retail establishment and its customers, i.e., to browse, examine and purchase
merchandise without harassment, to leave the store without being subjected to
accusations of theft, and to reenter the store at will for additional shopping, return or
exchange of merchandise"); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 372
(D. Del. 1996) ("Lewis had done her shopping and was leaving the store; no contractual
relationship remained."); Flowers v. TJX Cos., No. 91-CV-1339, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10453 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 1994) (same).
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post-purchase cases are most analogous to the now-superseded
reasoning of the Patterson majority, in which the Court rested its
opinion on the idea that "the right to make contracts does not
extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the
employer after the contract relation has been established ....
Thus, though some courts have recognized privileges, benefits,
terms, and conditions claims in addition to core refusal-to-deal
claims under § 1981, each successful § 1981 claim in this category
stems from a discriminatory privilege, benefit, term, or condition
that is tightly linked to the contractual moment, the "point of sale," in
the words of the Hill v. Shell Oil Co. court. Beneath these courts'
analyses is the idea that a contract occurs at a discrete moment or
"point" rather than Justice Stevens' "ongoing [contractual]
relationship." 66 As a result, discrimination that occurs outside the
bright lines of the contractual moment, prior to or following a
purchase, is left without remedy under § 1981. The First Circuit has
commented on this process of line-drawing, observing:
Of course, section 1981, like many laws, is more easily interpreted
at the polar extremes. The statute applies, for example, if a store
refuses, on race-based grounds, to permit a customer to purchase
its wares. By the same token, it does not apply if no contractual
relationship is ever contemplated by either party (say, if a store
manager makes a racially insensitive comment to a fireman who
responds to a false alarm). The harder cases occupy the middle
ground: cases in which a contract was made and the alleged
discrimination bears some relation to it. ... [plarticularly after the
passage of the 1991 amendment, such situations call for careful
line-drawing, case by case. 67
65. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177. Note, however, that in the cases of discrimination
against browsers, some courts read the § 1981 claims of shoppers discriminated against
after purchasing as asserting a right to a future contract, and held it not actionable. See,
e.g., Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 102 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[A] complaint must allege
the actual loss of a contract interest, not simply the theoretical loss of a possible future
opportunity to modify a contract."); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414 (7th Cir.
1996) ("A claim for interference with the right to make and enforce a contract must
allege the actual loss of a contract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract
opportunities."); Holmes v. Dillard's Dept. Stores, No. 99-3444, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17263, at *2 (D. La. Nov. 17, 2000) ("There is no generalized right under section 1981 to
have access to opportunities to make prospective contracts."). These courts do not
follow Justice Brennan's suggestion in Patterson, and consider post-purchase
discrimination evidence that the initial contract was made unequally. Patterson, 491 U.S.
at 207-08 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
66. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
67. Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added).
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Courts that have twice-narrowed § 1981 have chosen to draw
lines in the wrong places, creating areas of immunity for retailers in
which race and national origin discrimination is permitted and
protected. Part III of this article explains why judges might narrow
§ 1981, and then critiques post-1991 courts' § 1981 jurisprudence.
III. Explanation and Critique of Courts' § 1981 Jurisprudence
Judges who interpret § 1981 narrowly justify their decisions
with a similar refrain: they fear that the amended statute, if
unchecked, will be converted from a limited, contracts-based statute
into a generalized anti-discrimination law that would regulate a
wide variety of private behavior. This reluctance to expand § 1981
into the realm of the private was evident in Patterson itself, in which
the Court supported its denial of the plaintiff's claim by pointing to
the statute's limited scope when applied to acts of discrimination by
private citizens:
The law now reflects society's consensus that discrimination
based on the color of one's skin is a profound wrong of tragic
dimension. Neither our words nor our decisions should be
interpreted as signaling one inch of retreat from Congress' policy
to forbid discrimination in the private, as well as the public,
sphere. Nevertheless, in the area of private discrimination, to
which the ordinance of the Constitution does not directly extend,
our role is limited to interpreting what Congress may do and has
done.68
Courts even after the 1991 overruling of Patterson have
continued to echo these concerns. 69
68. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 188-89.
69. See Lewis, 948 F. Supp. at 371-72 (D. Del. 1996) ("Allowing plaintiff to proceed
under such a theory would come close to nullifying the contract requirement of section
1981 altogether, thereby transforming the statute into a general cause of action for race
discrimination in all contexts.") (emphasis added); Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358 ("[The
statute] does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination. Rather, it
prohibits intentional race discrimination with respect to certain enumerated activities.");
Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855 ("Section 1981 does not provide a general cause of action for
race discrimination if in fact it occurred. The requirement remains that a plaintiff must
point to some contractual relationship in order to bring a claim under Section 1981.").
See also Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100 ("The legislative history of the 1991 amendment makes it
crystal clear that Congress did not intend to convert section 1981 into a general
prohibition against race discrimination."); Baltimore-Clark, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 700 (noting
that, by expanding § 1981's coverage, "Congress did not intend to convert § 1981 into a
general prohibition against race discrimination"). Even the broader interpretations of §
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Courts' attention to the question of retaining limits on § 1981's
coverage may be reasonable. However, courts have responded to a
reasonable fear in an unreasonable way. In effect, courts
interpreting § 1981 narrowly since 1991 have given shopkeepers an
affirmative right to discriminate on the basis of race or national
origin. The courts that have twice-narrowed § 1981 in retail store
cases have been wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation and
contract law. They have also been wrong as a matter of history,
making decisions that are at odds with the development of property
and contract law over time. The remainder of this Part critiques
courts' § 1981 jurisprudence along these three axes.
A. Statutory Interpretation
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, courts" narrow
applications of § 1981 have ignored the 1991 amendments that
broadened the statute's coverage. Judges' limited readings of the
statute have also departed from the goals of the Congress that
passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, as evident in the Act's legislative
history. Finally, the narrow view of § 1981 is contrary to the maxim
of statutory interpretation that remedial statutes are to be read
broadly.
As explained in Part I, prior to 1991, § 1981 guaranteed to all
persons the same right as white citizens "to make and enforce
contracts." In 1991, Congress added subsection (b) entitled "'make
and enforce contracts' defined," which states, "For purposes of this
section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the
contractual relationship." Though phrased merely as a definition of
"make and enforce contracts," subsection (b) could in fact be read in
multiple ways. The use of the word "includes" could indicate that
the list of contractual activities enumerated in the clause is non-
exhaustive. Alternatively, the fact that the 1991 amendments were a
repudiation of the Supreme Court's Patterson decision could signal
that subsection (b) was meant primarily to reach discrimination
after contract formation, the focal point of the narrow Patterson
1981 advanced by this article would not convert the statute into a ban on race
discrimination in all contexts. It would be impossible to argue, for example, that § 1981
prohibits a person on the street from addressing another passer-by with a racial epithet.
The statute's coverage, even if interpreted to apply to pre-purchase, post-purchase,
browser, and potential customer discrimination, would still hinge on the existence of
some contractual relationship, albeit broadly defined.
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decision. Finally, subsection (b)'s reference to a "contractual
relationship" rather than just a "contract" could shift the statute's
coverage to the entire interaction between contracting parties, rather
than just the contents of the final bargain. 70
Yet even if a court does not accept any of these particular
readings of subsection (b), the clause must have some function
within the statute. At minimum, it should act as a signal to courts
that the statute's coverage may not be read to end with the "make
and enforce" clause of subsection (a). Given the presence of
subsection (b), some courts' complete disregard for the fact that the
statute was amended in 1991, even to the point of citing Patterson,
appears quite strange.71
However, even the courts that have adopted a slightly broader
view of the statute have appeared to ignore the expanded version of
the text, or at least shy away from full engagement with subsection
(b). Very few courts have recognized the potential difficulty in
determining what does and does not fall within the contractual
activities enumerated by the statute. As the First Circuit observed in
Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2002),
The harder cases occupy the middle ground: cases in which a
contract was made and the alleged discrimination bears some
relation to it. ... [p]articularly after the passage of the 1991
amendment, such situations call for careful line-drawing, case by
case."72
Courts' summary treatment of claims by browsers and shoppers
discriminated against pre-purchase and post-purchase illustrates
that few, if any, judges tackle the hard, case-by-case analysis
necessary to determine whether a retailer's discrimination
represents interference with a retail contract's "making,"
70. In Garrett v. Tandy Corp., the First Circuit chose to read subsection (b) in this
third way, extending the statute's protection beyond the contours of a specific contract:
The 1991 expansion of the definition of 'make and enforce contracts' in section
1981, then, extends the reach of the statute to situations beyond the four corners
of a particular contract; the extension applies to those situations in which a
merchant, acting out of racial animus, impedes a customer's ability to enter
into, or enjoy the benefits of, a contractual relationship.
295 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim, concluding that he had not shown discriminatory interference with any phase of
his contractual relationship with the store.).
71. See Part II, supra; Thomas v. National Amusements, Inc., No. 98-71215, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5188, at *8 (E.D. MI Feb. 24, 1999) (citing Patterson for the proposition that
"conduct that occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with
the right to enforce established contractual obligations" is not actionable under § 1981).
72. Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101.
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"performance," "modification," "termination," "benefits,"
"privileges," "terms," or "conditions." Instead, these courts have
generally dismissed plaintiffs' claims, drawing the boundaries of the
statute's protections very narrowly and tying its coverage to one,
fleeting contractual moment.
In addition to ignoring the full text of the statute, the narrow
decisions by these courts also contradict the goals of Congress in
amending § 1981. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 shows that Congress was motivated by dissatisfaction with the
Supreme Court's restricted Patterson decision and a desire to expand
the reach of the statute beyond the moment of contract formation.
In his discussion of the amended statute, Representative Henry
Hyde of Illinois described § 1981's expanded scope. His reference to
an African-American child's admittance to a private school could
just as easily apply to retail stores:
As written, therefore, section 1981 provides insufficient protection
against racial discrimination in the context of contracts. In
particular, it provides no relief for discrimination in the
performance of contracts (as contrasted with the making and
enforcement of contracts). Section 1981, as amended by this Act,
will provide a remedy for individuals who are subjected to
discriminatory performance of their employment contracts
(through racial harassment, for example) or are dismissed or
denied promotions because of race. In addition, the
discriminatory infringement of contractual rights that do not
involve employment will be made actionable under section 1981.
This will, for example, create a remedy for a black child who is admitted
to a private school as required pursuant to section 1981, but is then
subjected to discriminatory treatment in the performance of the contract
once he or she is attending the school.73
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah made similar observations about
the newly broadened § 1981, noting:
[W]e have overturned the Patterson versus McLean case, to cover
racial discrimination in terms and conditions of contracts under
section 1981. All postcontract matters will now be covered by the
racial provisions of section 1981, and that is a good step.
President Bush has been willing to overturn Patterson versus
McLean from the beginning, and so have all of us.74
Section 1981 in the form described by Representative Hyde and
73. 137 CONG. REC. H9505, H9543 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde)
(emphasis added).
74. 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15498 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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Senator Hatch is therefore quite broad, and would seem to provide
significant protection beyond the contractual moment.
In addition to Representative Hyde's and Senator Hatch's
comments regarding the new statute's scope, other Senators and
Representatives commented on its proper method of interpretation.
An interpretive memorandum by the sponsors of the Senate bill,
which also represented "the views of the [George H.W. Bush]
administration," explained that the statute's new second clause
expanding the definition of "make and enforce contracts," was
"illustrative only, and should be given broad construction to allow a
remedy for any act of intentional discrimination committed in the
making or the performance of a contract." 75 According to the
sponsors, the amended statute's enumeration of "making,"
"performance," "modification," "termination," "benefits,"
"privileges," "terms," and "conditions" should only be a starting
point, a floor, rather than a ceiling. Given this legislative history,
courts' narrow § 1981 decisions have strayed not only from the text
of the amended statute, but also from the goals of the 1991
amendments.
Finally, judges' restricted applications of § 1981 fly in the face of
the basic canon of statutory interpretation that remedial legislation
is to be read broadly, to favor the legislation's beneficiaries. Though
canons of statutory interpretation can certainly be challenged, those
challenges do not justify courts' narrow interpretations of § 1981 in
retail store cases.76 Judge Richard Posner has outlined a major
critique of the "broad interpretation" canon, arguing:
The idea behind this canon is that if the legislature is trying to
remedy some ill, it would want the courts to construe the
legislation to make it a more rather than a less effective remedy
for that ill. This would be a sound working rule if every statute -
at least every statute that could fairly be characterized as
"remedial" (which I suppose is every regulatory statute that does
not prescribe penal sanctions and so comes under another canon,
which I discuss later) - were passed because a majority of the
legislators wanted to stamp out some practice they considered to
be an evil; presumably they would want the courts to construe the
statute to advance that objective. But if, as is often true, the
statute is a compromise between one group of legislators that
holds a simple remedial objective but lacks a majority and another
group that has reservations about the objective, a court that
construed the statute broadly would upset the compromise that
75. Id. at S15483 (statement of Sen. Danforth).
76. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (identifying
conflicts among canons of statutory interpretation).
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the statute was intended to embody. 77
Judge Posner's critique rests on two contingencies: that the
statute not be truly remedial, and that the statute not be passed by a
convincing majority of the legislators. As an initial matter, civil
rights statutes, particularly those passed during Reconstruction, are
quintessentially remedial. Justice Scalia has explicitly stated with
regard to the Equal Protection Clause, the authority under which §
1981 was reenacted in 1870, that "broad interpretation [is]
particularly important with regard to racial discrimination, since
that was the principal evil against which the Equal Protection
Clause was directed, and the principal constitutional prohibition
that some of the States stubbornly ignored." 78 Adding another
remedial layer, Congress then amended § 1981 specifically to
remedy the harm done by the Supreme Court's narrow Patterson
decision. Congress also gave unmistakable support to the 1991
amendments: the Senate passed the Act with a vote of ninety-three
to five, with two not voting, and the House passed it by a margin of
381 to 38 votes, with 13 members not voting.79 Critiques such as
Posner's, though perhaps applicable to other statutes, fall short
when applied to § 1981. Though judges could comfortably employ
this maxim of statutory interpretation in § 1981 retail store cases and
extend the statute's coverage to many claims they now dismiss,
many steadfastly refuse to do so.
B. Contract Law
Courts' narrow interpretations of § 1981 are also wrong as a
matter of contract law. In assessing claims of discrimination in retail
stores, courts have interpreted both the duration and the content of
retail contracts quite narrowly. For the most part, they have viewed
the contract as beginning and ending with the moment of exchange
of money for goods. They have also seen retail contracts as bargains
solely for the goods purchased. Though courts' § 1981 decisions
seem motivated by this narrow view of contract, it is in fact
extremely rare to find a § 1981 retail decision in which a judge has
77. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 808-09 (1983).
78. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 102nd Congress, 1st Session, available at
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/roll call vote cfm.cfm?congress
=102&session=1&vote=00238 (last visited April 17, 2007) and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d102:SN01745:@@@R. (last visited April 17, 2007). Notably, the House
bill had 175 co-sponsors.
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actually analyzed the contract at hand, with reference to principles
of contract law. Garrett v. Tandy Corp. is the one exception, with the
First Circuit acknowledging the need to turn to state contract law.80
For the most part, though, judges have proceeded almost blindly
through § 1981 analyses, making conclusory and unsupported
decisions about a retail contract's duration and content.
In neglecting to analyze the contracts that lie under a § 1981
claim, since 1991 courts have followed, improperly, in the Supreme
Court's footsteps. Professor Steven J. Burton criticizes Patterson on
this ground, noting, "None of the nine Supreme Court justices...
consulted contract law to interpret that statute, and counsel for
neither of the parties used it in their advocacy." 8' According to
Burton, because "section 1981 does not establish an independent
statutory right to make and enforce contracts," courts have no
choice but to turn to "a right that exists elsewhere in the law-in
particular, in the law of contracts." 82 By failing to draw upon the
body of contract law, both the Patterson Court and post-1991 courts
have issued decisions in § 1981 retail store cases that are flawed,
particularly in their treatment of a retail contract's duration and
content.
1. Duration
Courts could define a retail contract's duration in several ways.
First, a contract might be viewed not as a moment, but rather as a
continuing interaction between the contracting parties. "Contract"
becomes a verb, rather than a noun.83 In this view, § 1981 does not
protect the contents of a particular agreement frozen in time, but
instead a customer's ability to exercise his or her right to contract
over the course of his or her interaction with a retailer. The
customer's movement through the store, evaluation of the
merchandise, and consideration of the store's various guarantees
and representations would all be components of the retail contract.
The contract is formed gradually, as a product of the customer's
exercise of his or her right to contract over time. Any interference
80. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 100 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Section 1981, insofar as it
is pertinent here, pivots on contractual relationships, and the contours of what
constitutes a 'contract' (or a 'contractual relationship,' for that matter) are properly
found in state law."). One other § 1981 case has drawn on state contract law, but is
inapposite here, as it involves state laws concerning the redemption of coupons. See
Hampton v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001).
81. Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a State
Law Alternative, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 446 (1990).
82. Id.
83. Interview with Professor Joseph William Singer (December 2004).
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with that right, whether before, during, or after a purchase is made,
is then prohibited by § 1981.
In critiquing Patterson, Professor George H. Taylor argues that
this view of a right to contract, exercised over the course of a
relationship, is in fact mandated by the law of contracts:
If the Court had been more attentive to the insights of contract
law, it would have realized that contract law denies that the
moment of contract formation is decisive. The Uniform
Commercial Code, for example, acknowledges the potential need
to define contract formation where "the moment of its making is
undetermined." As the secondary commentaries have suggested,
the Code recognizes the possibility of circumstances contrary to
the orthodox catechism that there is a definite moment in time
when a party becomes contractually bound on a promise.84
Burton makes a similar point, describing the contract right as "a
single integrated legal power" and noting that, "[f]ar from isolating
formation, performance, and enforcement from each other, the
modern law of contracts treats the stages of contract as
interdependent and mutually supporting parts of a coherent social
practice."8 5 Here, Burton's argument echoes the characterization of
contract as "evidence of a vital, ongoing relationship between
human beings" from Justice Stevens' Patterson opinion.86
Though Burton was writing in 1990, when § 1981 covered only
contracts' making and enforcement, his insights hold true today
when applied to the broadened statute. If all customers possess an
integrated, continuing right to contract, and the "moment of
contract formation" is indeterminate, courts can then view the
interaction between a retailer and those who enter his or her store as
occurring on a continuum. Browsers could not be excluded from §
1981's protections, as a browser's movement through the store and
contemplation of the store's goods and prices would represent an
exercise of his or her right to contract. In addition, customers who
have already made purchases become browsers or potential
customers once again, or are parties to a continuing contractual
relationship with a retailer, able to "enforce" or "perform" their
contract with regard to the goods purchased. Contracts in retail
stores loop back on themselves, and those who enter are at every
84. George H. Taylor, Textualism at Work, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 275 (1995). See also
U.C.C. § 2-204(2) ("An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.").
85. Burton, supra note 81, at 445.
86. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
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point exercising in some manner an integrated "right to contract."
A scenario suggested by Professor Elizabeth Warren illustrates
this view of a retail contract's duration.87 From the time a potential
customer enters a retail store, he or she begins to exercise the right
to contract, and the terms of the contract between the customer and
retailer form over time. If browsers and potential customers are not
allowed to walk freely through a store, ask questions, examine the
goods available, compare prices, and consider stores'
representations of the quality of the goods, they miss critical steps in
the contracting process. For example, a banner hanging in a store
advertising a money-back guarantee or a sign describing the goods
sold as "100 % cotton" would become part of the contract between
store and customer. If a customer is discriminatorily pulled into a
back room on suspicion of shoplifting or ejected from a store prior
to making a purchase, he or she is not allowed to read the banner or
consider the sign, and has not been able to exercise equally his or
her right to contract. This view of "contract" as a verb rather than a
noun, as a process rather than a moment, stays true to the contract
law underpinnings of § 1981 and gives full force to Congress'
broadening of the statute in 1991. However, courts have not
adopted this view, and instead issue opinions that rely on the
misguided idea that a retail contract begins and ends at a single
moment.
A second possible view of a retail contract's duration draws
more explicitly on present-day state contract law, and contemplates
a series of contracts' being made and re-made throughout a
customer's time in a store. In Garrett v. Tandy Corp., the First Circuit
stated that, "[s]hopping in a retail store may involve multiple
contracts. Each time a customer takes an item off the shelf, a new
contract looms, and each time the item is returned, the potential
contract is extinguished." 88 Though in the end the Garrett court
upheld the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, its
decision is notable in its engagement with the law of contracts.
Because no state law definition of a retail contract existed in
Maine, where Garrett arose, the court drew on state contract cases
from Maryland, Georgia, and Oklahoma to develop this fluid
interpretation of retail contracts. These three cases concerned a
retailer's responsibility for pre-purchase injuries suffered by
customers from exploding soda bottles. In order to determine the
retailers' liability, the courts had to determine first whether the
customer had entered into a contract with the store at the time of the
explosion. Unlike the courts interpreting § 1981 in retail store cases,
87. Interview with Harvard Law School Professor Elizabeth Warren (June 5, 2005).
88. Garrett, 295 F.3d at 100.
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the Maryland, Georgia, and Oklahoma Supreme Courts uniformly
distinguished between a retail contract and a retail sale. In these
courts' analyses,
[T]he retailer's act of placing the bottles upon the shelf with the
price stamped upon the six-pack in which they were contained
manifested an intent to offer them for sale, the terms of the offer
being that it would pass title to the goods when [the customer]
presented them at the check-out counter and paid the stated price
in cash. We also think that the evidence is sufficient to show that
[the customer's] act of taking physical possession of the goods
with the intent to purchase them manifested an intent to accept
the offer and a promise to take them to the check-out counter and
pay for them there.8 9
The Georgia Supreme Court explained further that a customer
could manifest his or her "acceptance" in one of three ways:
(1) by delivering the goods to the check-out counter and paying
for them; (2) by the promise to pay for the goods as evidenced by
their physical delivery to the check-out counter; and (3) by the
promise to deliver the goods to the check-out counter and to pay
for them there as evidenced by taking physical possession of the
goods by their removal from the shelf. 90
By stocking the shelves, a store makes an offer, or a promise, to
sell. By picking up the item, the customer accepts, and makes a
return promise to pay. The contract is made at that point, and the
sale, a separate transaction, is completed at the checkout counter.
Only one § 1981 retail store court has come close to viewing the
interaction between a customer and a retail store in this manner. In
Ackerman v. Food-4-Less, No. 98-CV-1011, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813
(E.D. Pa. June 10, 1998), the court stated:
The purpose of going to a grocery store is to buy groceries. The
purpose of picking an item off the shelf at a grocery store is so one
may buy it. We feel that it is a very reasonable inference that
Plaintiff picked up the Spanish spice powder so that she could
purchase the seasoning.91
89. Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 605 (1975).
90. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 33-34 (1976); see also Barker v.
Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (1979) ("The issue here is whether a buyer of
goods who is invited by a merchant to take possession thereof from a self-service display
and to defer payment to sometime subsequent to the taking of possession, has the
protection of an implied warranty of merchantability. We hold he does.").
91. Ackerman v. Food-4-Less, No. 98-CV-1011, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *8-9
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The court seemed to view the plaintiff's "taking physical
possession of the goods by their removal from the shelf"92 as an
acceptance of the store's offer. Nevertheless, later in the decision,
the Ackerman court reverted to an idea of the contract and the sale as
being identical and existing only at the moment of purchase, stating
that if the plaintiff had been able to purchase groceries, a contract
would have been made.93 This collapsing of contract and sale into a
single contractual moment is the typical approach by courts in §
1981 retail store cases, despite state contract law to the contrary.
This state-law based interpretation would save the claims of
shoppers who experience pre-purchase discrimination. Because the
contract is made when a customer chooses an item from a shelf, this
view of contract formation would also preserve the claims of
customers who consider purchasing but do not complete a sale.
However, as in Garrett itself, claims of post-purchase discrimination
would still remain outside the coverage of § 1981. Taylor notes this
problem:
In the example favored by treatise writers, where a customer is
injured by a bottle that explodes after the customer has taken it off
the grocery store shelf, a contract between store and customer had
already been formed at the time of injury-the merchant had
made an offer through the stocking of the goods, and the
customer had accepted the offer through the performance of
taking the item from the shelf. Under this logic, where a cashier
[engages in discrimination after the purchase], this occurs
subsequent to the formation of a contract and so does not present
a viable section 1981 claim.94
Claims of browsers, who possess no intent to purchase and
therefore might not pick up items from shelves, are left out of this
formulation of retail contract as well. Therefore, this view of
contract therefore falls short. In order to bring such claims within
the ambit of § 1981, courts would need to shift their focus from the
contractual moment to the contractual process, and begin reading §
1981 as Justice Stevens did in Patterson.
A final proposal for defining a retail contract's duration has its
roots in Blackstone's writings on the obligations of innkeepers and
common carriers to the public. In this view, a retail store makes an
"offer" of its goods by opening itself to the public. The customer
(E.D. Pa. June 10, 1998).
92. Fender, 138 Ga. App. at 33-34.
93. Ackerman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8813, at *9 (emphasis added).
94. Taylor, supra note 84, at 272.
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then "accepts" by making a purchase. Professor Joseph William
Singer relates that, in his 1765 Commentaries on the Laws of
England, Sir William Blackstone identified as an "offer" an
innkeeper's, common carrier's, "or other victualler['s]" hanging of a
sign advertising his services. 95 When a customer "steps inside" and
"tenders the usual fare," he or she accepts the offer, and the contract
is made.96 Wesley Hohfeld agreed with this formulation, noting that
the only way an offeror of public accommodation could rescind his
or her offer would be to go out of business.97 More recently,
Professor Stephen E. Haydon has proposed that "any business that
extends a general offer of the sale of goods or services arguably has
made an offer to contract, and anyone denied the opportunity to
contract because of his or her race may invoke section 1981."98
In the retail store context, the store's sign would represent the
retailer's offer, and a customer's payment at the checkout counter
would represent "tendering the usual fare." The contract would
then be complete. If post-1991 courts were to adopt this view of a
retail contract's duration, many § 1981 retail store claims that courts
currently dismiss would survive. Any pre-purchase discrimination
by a retailer between the time a customer enters a store and arrives
at the checkout counter would represent a violation of § 1981, likely
a core infringement on the customer's ability to "make" a contract.
Discrimination against browsers, as well as post-purchase
discrimination, however, might still stand on shaky ground.
Yet despite the historical roots of this concept of a retail
contract's duration, it is almost certainly wrong. As Singer notes, it
is unlikely that the mere fact that a retail store is open for business
could constitute a specific offer to an individual shopper. 99 In
addition, the modern § 1981 plaintiffs who have attempted to
characterize a retail contract's duration in this way have failed. In
Lewis v. J.C. Penney, 948 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1996), the plaintiff
95. Singer, supra note 9, at 1309.
96. Id. at 1309-10 ("When the carrier holds itself out as open to serve the public, it
presents an offer that is accepted the moment a passenger tenders the usual fare, and the
contract is breached if the carrier refuses to serve the passenger.").
97. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 52 (1913) ("It would therefore seem that the innkeeper is, to
some extent, like one who had given an option to every traveling member of the public.
He differs, as regards net legal effect, only because he can extinguish his present
liabilities and the correlative powers of the traveling members of the public by going out
of business.").
98. Stephen E. Haydon, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in
Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1223 (1997).
99. Singer, supra note 9, at 1346 ("[O]pening up an inn to the public would not be
considered a promise to serve particular individuals that is sufficiently definite so as to
constitute a legally-binding obligation.").
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"claimed the existence of an unstated, unwritten contract between
commercial establishments and the public, that all who enter
premises of the former will be treated equally regardless of race." 100
In rejecting what it characterized as a "nebulous contract theory,"
the court stated that, "Allowing plaintiff to proceed under such a
theory would come close to nullifying the contract requirement of
section 1981 altogether, thereby transforming the statute into a
general cause of action for race discrimination in all contexts." 101
Likewise, in Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, No. 96-8262, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3570 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 1998), the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument for a "presumed right to be free of race
discrimination while accepting a store's invitation to shop."102
Building on decisions like Lewis and Ackaa, Professor Deseriee A.
Kennedy summarizes courts' approach:
Most courts do not recognize as viable claims of black plaintiffs to
the same right to shop as whites. Consumers who allege
discriminatory treatment in the form of being followed or
subjected to heightened surveillance, without more, frequently
fail to articulate a viable cause of action under Section 1981.103
Thus, like the rolling contracts in Garrett, the Blackstonian idea of a
store's general offer to the public, accepted by a customer's tender of
money, is also inadequate. 04 For § 1981 to provide the protection its
drafters in 1866 and its revisers in 1991 intended, courts should alter
their vision of a retail contract's duration and accept the idea of a
contract as a process, rather than a moment.
2. Content
In addition to their missteps in defining the duration of a retail
100. Lewis v. J.C. Penney, 948 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D. Del. 1996).
101. Id.
102. Ackaa v. Tommy Hilfiger, No. 96-8262, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3570, at *14 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 24, 1998) (emphasis added).
103. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 306-07.
104. If, however, a retail store were to go beyond merely hanging a sign, and also
advertise its products and their prices through the mail or by other means, the store
might be deemed to be inviting offers by customers. Though not an offer itself, such an
invitation could be seen as the beginning of a relationship between customer and retailer
that culminates in the formation of a contract. Because the store's invitation to the
customer starts the contracting process and is necessary for the contract's eventual
formation, a retailer's discrimination against a customer responding to a store's
advertisement would then violate § 1981. See WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS, § 27 (3rd ed. 1957) ("[Ilf goods are advertised for sale at a certain price...
such an advertisement is a mere invitation to enter into a bargain rather than an offer.").
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contract, courts have been wrong in limiting the bargain between a
customer and a store to the goods purchased. In his Patterson
opinion, Justice Brennan highlighted the absurdity of the majority's
decision to restrict the content of an employment contract to only
the offer and acceptance of the job.105 Analogizing the Patterson
plaintiff's situation to one in which an employer informs an African-
American applicant that she is hired, but will have to suffer racial
harassment on the job, Justice Brennan stated,
I see no relevant distinction between that case and one in which
the employer's different contractual expectations are unspoken,
but become clear during the course of employment as the black
employee is subjected to substantially harsher conditions than her
white co-workers. 106
The retail store analog to Justice Brennan's hypothetical job offer is a
circumstance in which a retailer states to customers, "you can make
purchases in my store, but if you are African American, Latino, or
Asian American, you will have to suffer racial harassment in order
to do so." Like the Patterson majority, the post-1991 courts that have
applied § 1981 narrowly would likely dismiss the claim of a
customer presented with such a statement. Except in cases like
Williams v. Cloverleaf Farms Dairy and others described in Part II.C, in
which the harassment or discrimination occurs at the very point of
purchase, courts have focused only on the goods sold, and excluded
from the contract, and therefore also from the statute's coverage, the
quality of the service provided.
An alternative view of the content of retail contracts, closer to
that of Justice Brennan in Patterson, would include services as well
as goods as part of the bargain between a store and a customer.
Indeed, one could argue that, because it is nearly impossible to
make a purchase without interacting with some store personnel,107
the quality of the service provided by that personnel must then be
part of the customer's contract with the store. As Kennedy
observes, "It is artificial to separate out those acts inimical to
shopping from the exchange of tender for goods at the cash
register."108
In contexts other than retail stores, courts have been willing to
105. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 208 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
106. Id.
107. The advent of self-service checkout lanes in supermarkets, for example, might
present a situation in which a customer could shop without interacting with another
human being.
108. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 322.
[Vol. 4
COME DOWN AND MAKE BARGAINS IN GOOD FAITH
recognize services, as well as goods, as part of the bargain between
seller and purchaser. Professor Anne-Marie Harris argues that
"there is precedent for the proposition that § 1981 proscribes race-
based harassment.., when such conduct degrades-but does not
completely deny-goods or services for customers of color." 10 9
Courts' willingness to consider service as part of the contract
between buyer and seller is most clear in § 1981 claims brought by
plaintiffs discriminated against in restaurants. Though courts have
not been entirely uniform in their treatment of § 1981 restaurant
claims, many have held unequivocally that a customer contracts
with a restaurant not only for the food purchased, but also for the
service provided." 0
In Charity v. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-0554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11462 (D. La. July 27, 1999), African-American plaintiffs were
harassed by a waiter, who stated, "[m]anagement can't force me to
serve niggers." n ' The court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim,
despite the fact that they were successfully able to purchase food,
and had thereby made a contract with the restaurant. The court
held that "[d]ining in a restaurant includes being served in an
atmosphere which a reasonable person would expect in the chosen
place. Courts have recognized that the contract formed between a
restaurant and a customer does include more than just the food
ordered." 112 Similarly, in McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Ill. 1998), the African-American plaintiffs ordered
pizza to eat inside the restaurant." 3 The restaurant personnel
refused to give them plates, napkins, and utensils, and told them to
eat out of the pizza boxes. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs
had no § 1981 claim because "they were not denied the right to
contract in that they were provided their pizza and permitted to eat
109. Harris, supra note 6, at 47.
110. Interestingly, there is a dispute among courts in § 1981 restaurant cases over the
proper prima facie case. Some courts require that a plaintiff make an initial showing
that he or she was denied a contract right that remained available to similarly situated
white customers. See, e.g., Givens v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 03-3367, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5204, at *17 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2006). Other courts reject this prong of the prima
facie case, noting that, in the transitory context of a restaurant, a plaintiff may not be able
to identify a white comparator. These courts require simply that a § 1981 plaintiff show
that he or she received service in a "markedly hostile manner" that a reasonable person
would find "objectively discriminatory." Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d
862, 872 (6th Cir. 2001). For further discussion of pleading requirements in § 1981 retail
store cases, see Matt Graves, Purchasing Mhile Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination
in the Marketplace, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 159 (2001).
111. Charity v. Denny's, Inc., No. 98-0554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11462, at *4 (D. La.
July 27, 1999).
112. Id. at *11-12.
113. McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (D. Ill., 1998)
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it at the restaurant." 114 The court, however, held that the restaurant
had failed to provide the plaintiffs with the "full value of their
purchase" by denying them "the accoutrements that are ordinarily
provided with a restaurant meal at the Godfrey Pizza Hut."" 5
Finally, in Perry v. Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), the court refused to dismiss the § 1981 claim of an African-
American plaintiff who was denied access to the restaurant
bathroom after he had purchased, and eaten, his food.116 The court
held that the "plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1981, particularly if
Perry is considered to have contracted for food and use of the bathroom." 117
In each of these cases, courts have defined the contract between
customer and restaurant as encompassing more than the food sold.
They have recognized the service provided by restaurant staff,
"atmosphere," "accoutrements," and use of the bathroom as
contractual terms protected by § 1981. Notably, courts accepted
these additional contractual terms even though Denny's, Pizza Hut,
and Burger King are all fast food, low-cost establishments, not
known for their "atmosphere" or high-end service. There is no
principled reason why service should not also be considered part of
the contract between a customer and a retail store. Many of the
claims cited in Parts II and III arose out of acts of discrimination in
clothing stores, where customers must often consult with
salespeople in order to try on clothes. Even in supermarkets and
convenience stores, customers must often ask for assistance in
locating items on the shelves. In addition, retail store customers,
just like restaurant patrons, often need to use the bathroom. Finally,
a retail store's "atmosphere" certainly affects a customer's decision
to spend his or her money there or elsewhere. Just as a customer's
movement through a store, asking of questions, comparison of
prices, and evaluation of the quality of goods might be relevant to a
contract's duration, these services might also be considered
additional parts of a contract's content. Courts' continued insistence
on excluding services from their consideration of retail contracts,
except in situations where discriminatory service is tightly tethered
to the contractual moment, therefore appears without foundation.118
114. Id. at 1047.
115. Id. at 1048.
116. Perry v. Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y., 1996)
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D. Ohio 2002) ("Though she only
called plaintiff a name that any African-American would find deeply offensive after he
had completed his purchases and was about to exit, that she did so at all is clear and
direct proof of bias. It also indicates that the 'service' she provided was less than that
which she might have provided, had plaintiff been Caucasian.").
In Leach, as in Justice Brennan's Patterson opinion, quality of service functions not
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C. Historical Development of Property and Contract Law
Finally, courts' narrow § 1981 decisions are out of step with the
historical development of property and contract law. Courts have
expressed great reluctance to transform § 1981 into "a general cause
of action for race discrimination in all contexts." 119 As a result, they
restrict § 1981's coverage to "core" claims-a retailer's outright
refusal to deal or imposition of discriminatory terms and conditions
at the moment of purchase -and leave plaintiffs with claims of
browser, pre-purchase or post-purchase discrimination with no
remedy. In essence, these courts' narrow applications of the statute
produce only two "rules" that retailers must follow: allow all
customers equal entry and take all customers' money on equal terms
at the checkout counter. However, seen in their historical context,
these two "rules" are themselves radical, contrary to traditional
notions of private property and freedom of contract. That courts
now enforce § 1981's two radical "rules" without protest, requiring
equal access and equal right to purchase, but then balk at requiring
equal treatment of browsers and customers both before and after
their purchases, seems quite odd.
Historically, the right to exclude was seen as "the most central
right associated with property." 120 In 1885, the Supreme Court in
Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536 (1885), expressed a concern that § 1981
might be interpreted to make inroads on a retailer's right to deny
entry to any member of the public.'21 Addressing the question of an
African-American ticket holder's right of access to a skating rink, the
Bowlin Court rejected any reading of the statute contrary to the rule
that "neither [the plaintiffi, nor any other person, could demand, as
a right under the law, that the privilege of entering the place be
accorded to him."122 However, just as the Bowlin court feared,
courts today apply § 1981 to eliminate the retailer's right to exclude.
as part of a contract's content, but rather as a signal about the nature of the contract that
was formed earlier, at the time of purchase. Notably, though the Leach court read § 1981
more expansively than many other courts, even this reading relied on a "contractual
moment" view of contract, the nature of which judges investigate by observing post-
purchase behavior.
119. Lewis v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (D. Del. 1996).
120. Singer, supra note 9, at 1456 ("[Fjederal and state statutes substantially limit the
right of the owner to exclude members of the public on an invidious basis like race ...
[This limitation] cannot usefully be described as a minimal interference with the
property rights of the owner.").
121. Bowlin v. Lyon, 67 Iowa 536, 540 (1885)
122. Id.
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As the Sixth Circuit explained in Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles,
915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990), in order to make the retail contract the
statute protects, a customer must first be able to enter a store.123
"Were it otherwise, commercial establishments could avoid liability
merely by refusing minorities entrance to the establishment .... 124
Today's statute, in effect, grants customers a privilege to enter,
eliminates retailers' right to exclude, and creates a defense to
retailers' claims of trespass.1l 5
The change in courts' interpretation of § 1981 from Bowlin in
1885 to Watson in 1990 was not inevitable. Indeed, courts had at
least two colorable arguments for continuing to uphold retailers'
claimed right to exclude in the face of § 1981 challenges. First, they
could have decided that, despite § 1981's property law implications,
the statute simply is not a public accommodations law mandating
equal access for all. Here, they could rely on the fact that in 1875, a
mere five years after § 1981 was reenacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress passed a separate federal public
accommodations law. Congress therefore could not have meant §
1981 to be interpreted as a public accommodations statute, for the
1875 law would then have been duplicative. 126
Second, Congress in 1964 specifically refused to include retail
stores in the coverage of Title II, the public accommodations portion
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In an early version of what
eventually became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II covered
"every form of business" and excluded only "rooming houses with
five units or less."127 However, in response to concerns that such a
broad public accommodations provision would spark resistance by
Southern members of Congress 128 and doom the bill, Title II was
amended to exclude retail stores and personal service firms, such as
123. Watson v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 915 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1990). Though Watson
was decided prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, because the plaintiffs were asked to
leave, it represents a "core" § 1981 case that was likely to be successful both before and
after the broadening of the statute in 1991.
124. Id. at 243; see also Singer, supra note 9, at 1434 ("Refusal to allow a customer to
enter the store is equivalent to a refusal to contract; it is a discriminatory refusal to deal.
The license to enter the store is necessary to make good on the store's implicit invitation
to deal.").
125. See Hohfeld, supra note 97, at 30 (explaining the "jural opposites" of rights, no-
rights, privileges, and duties).
126. Singer, supra note 9, at 1427.
127. CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 35 (1985).
128. In particular see statements by Judge Smith of Virginia, "Referring to the fact that
a chiropodist whose office was in a hotel would be covered by Title II, he made a shrill
outburst. 'If I were cutting corns,' he cried, 'I would want to know whose feet I would
have to be monkeying around with. I would want to know whether they smelled good
or bad."' Id. at 110.
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barbershops.1 29
Today's courts could have refused to use § 1981 to make an
end-run around Congress' specific withholding of public
accommodations protection to retail stores in 1964.130 Yet despite
the existence of these options for different interpretation, today's
courts interpret § 1981 in retail store contexts as requiring retailers
to allow customers to enter. Though this application of the statute
destroys "the most central right associated with property," 131 courts
nevertheless repeatedly uphold the claims of plaintiffs who assert
core § 1981 claims of retailers' outright refusals to deal.
Courts' interpretations of § 1981 make similar inroads on basic
notions of freedom of contract. As summarized by Singer, legal
thinkers during the classical era conceived of the freedom of
contract as encompassing not only the freedom to make contracts,
but also the freedom from forced contracting.132 Singer identifies
this principle as the root of such doctrines as fraud, duress, and
incapacity, all examples of situations in which a contracting party's
entry into a contract is not of his or her free will. 133 This ban on
forced contracts also applied to those contracts forced by statute:
"Ultimately, the courts interpreted the constitutional protection of
liberty and property to prohibit regulation of market relations by the
legislature as well."134 An additional component of the classical
129. Id. at 47, 58.
130. Some commentators, such as Professor William Eskridge, argue that reading a
later statute back onto an earlier statue to fill the gaps in the earlier statute is in fact an
appropriate method of statutory interpretation. William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479, 1504 (1987) ("Federal judges
interpreting the Constitution typically consider not only the constitutional text and its
historical background, but also its subsequent interpretational history, related
constitutional developments, and current societal facts... In other countries, the civil
law codes typically instruct judges to interpret unclear statutes and fill in statutory
lacunae by looking to analogous statutory rules, general principles of the state's legal
order, and the justice or equity of the case."). In addition, as a general matter, the chance
that § 1981 might be interpreted to fill a gap in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not doom that interpretation of § 1981. See Evan William Glover, Legitimacy of
Independent Contractor Suits for Hostile Work Environment Under Section 1981, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 1301, 1304 n.27 (2001) ("The legislature also clarified its intent with regard to
statutory interpretation. Congress instructed that as a general rule of construction, one
federal civil rights law should not be interpreted to narrow the scope of protection of
another; thus, section 1981's remedies are independent of other laws.")
131. Singer, supra note 9, at 1456.
132. Id. at 1347 ("On the contract side, the courts and scholars began the process of
developing the ideology of freedom of contract based on the assumption that the terms
of contractual relationships would be left to the free will of the parties rather than
dictated by the state.").
133. Joseph William Singer, Review Essay: Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 479
(1988).
134. Id.
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approach to contracts was a prohibition on the state's "regulat[ion]
of the substantive terms of private relations." 35 Thus, to legal
theorists in the classical era, all decisions regarding contracts-
whether to make them and what content they should have-were
assigned to the individual contracting parties and were required to
be free from both private and public coercion.
Seen in this light, even today's courts' narrow application of §
1981 to core claims of retail store discrimination is contrary to
classical notions of freedom of contract. Retailers are forced to deal
with all shoppers, regardless of whether they would otherwise
choose to make such contracts. As with the property law
dimensions of § 1981, this interpretation of § 1981 is radical, but not
inevitable. Singer relates that § 1981's language on the right to
contract might have been interpreted as requiring only the
enforcement of contracts made between willing parties. In this
view, customers would not be able to force retailers to sell to them,
but would be able to enforce a contract in court once made.136 This
is not the approach taken by courts in current § 1981 retail store
cases. As illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Causey v. Sewell
Cadillac-Chevrolet, 394 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2004), courts read as a core §
1981 violation a retailer's refusal "to engage in business with a
consumer attempting to contract with the merchant." 37 Section
1981 therefore trumps retailers' objections to forced contracting, and
requires unwilling parties to transact with one another.
Given the history of property and contract law, courts'
willingness to overcome retailers' right to exclude and freedom of
contract in their applications of § 1981 to discrimination in retail
stores seems quite radical. It is hard to understand why, having
taken such steps, courts would then narrow the statute to exclude
claims of discrimination by browsers or customers discriminated
against either before or after their purchase. The exclusion of these
claims is curious on several dimensions.
First, if a greater power - or prohibition - generally also includes
the lesser, it would appear that, once granted the greater right to
enter a store, a customer would also possess the lesser right to
consider the merchandise without discrimination.138 Seen from the
other direction, once granted the greater power to force a retailer to
contract, a customer could also claim the lesser power to shop
before or exit after purchasing free of discriminatory harassment.
135. Id.
136. Singer, supra note 9, at 1427.
137. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 2004)
138. See, e.g., New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 717 (1981)
("The State's power to ban the sale of alcoholic beverages entirely includes the lesser
power to ban the sale of liquor on premises where topless dancing occurs.").
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Second, it seems unlikely that Congress actually contemplated a
§ 1981 regime that would force retailers to allow customers into
their stores and block retailers from ejecting them, but then make
customers sitting ducks for discrimination at any point except
purchase. Could § 1981 really reflect both Congress' reluctance to
legislate the "private" interactions of customers and retailers
between entry and purchase and Congress' complete disregard for
retailers' right to exclude and freedom of contract? Though such a
reading of the statute seems implausible, today's courts apply § 1981
in just this way.
Third, courts' alarm at the idea of expanding § 1981's coverage
into "all contexts," though perhaps reasonable, seems misplaced. 139
As an initial matter, it is unclear why courts have adopted the idea
that additional protection of retail customers under § 1981 will pave
the way to § 1981 regulation of truly private interactions at dinner
parties or in book clubs, for example. Retail store plaintiffs are not
arguing for coverage in "all contexts," but rather for coverage in all
phases of their contractual relationship with a retail store.140 Yet even
if courts were only alarmed by expanded coverage of browsers and
customers before and after their purchases, their alarm would still
be misplaced. Seen in light of property and contract law, the proper
time for alarm was 1866, when Congress first passed the "absolutely
revolutionary" § 1981.141 It is bordering on the absurd that courts
continue to express alarm at interpreting § 1981 broadly, given that
even the most "conservative" application of the statute to "core"
cases, which courts do willingly, requires radical property and
contract law decisions.
Once courts recognize that their current, "narrow" applications
of § 1981 in fact impose quite heavy burdens on retailers at the point
of entry and the point of purchase, their arbitrary limitations on the
statute's coverage appear unjustifiable. Courts should recognize §
1981 as the radical statute that Senator Trumbull and his colleagues
knew they were passing in 1866. They should cease arbitrarily
creating a no-man's-land between the point of entry and the point of
sale in which acts of discrimination are permitted and protected.
139. Lewis v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 372-73 (D. Del. 1996).
140. The First Circuit makes this distinction in Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94,
101 (1st Cir. 2002) observing that § 1981 clearly would not apply "if a store manager
makes a racially insensitive comment to a fireman who responds to a false alarm").
141. Sullivan, supra note 12, at 547 n.38.
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IV. Directions for an Improved § 1981 Jurisprudence
A. Model § 1981 Retail Store Cases: Statutory Interpretation,
Duration, and Content
Though most courts have interpreted § 1981 since the 1991
amendments very narrowly, and have based their decisions on a
constricted view of the underlying retail contract, some courts and
commentators have adopted broader analyses. These expansive
interpretations of the post-1991 statute should serve as models for
future courts' § 1981 retail store decisions. These courts have also
analyzed the contractual relationship between customer and retailer,
and have taken a view of the contract's duration and content that is
more nuanced and loyal to contract law than most § 1981 retail store
opinions.
First, Garrett v. Tandy Corp. shows courts the appropriate way of
interpreting the scope of the post-1991 statute. 42 In Garrett, the First
Circuit characterized the 1991 amendments as having expanded the
statute's reach to "situations beyond the four corners of a particular
contract." 143 The court also explained the history of § 1981, noting
that, in response to Patterson, "Congress widened the interpretive lens
when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991." 144 Though the court
ultimately decided against the plaintiffs on contract law grounds,
the First Circuit's description of the broadened post-1991 statute
serves as a model. As in Garrett, courts should consider § 1981's
requirement of equality not only in a contract's creation and
enforcement, but also in its entire performance, modification,
termination, privileges, benefits, terms, and conditions.
Second, courts would benefit from engaging with the law of
contracts, as the Garrett court did. However, courts should be wary
of adopting wholesale the First Circuit's contract law analysis, for it
veers dangerously close to the discredited Patterson practice of
denying the statue's coverage to claims of post-purchase
discrimination. Courts should instead follow Professor Burton's
and Justice Stevens' approach, viewing the entire interaction
between a retailer and those who enter a store as part of a single
contractual relationship.
In Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911 (D. Ohio 2002), the
142. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 2002)
143. Id. at 100.
144. Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
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court began to develop a Burton-like view of a retail contract's
duration. The court analyzed the entire "course of [the] dealing"
between a store clerk and a customer, reading the earlier transaction
between clerk and customer in light of the clerk's later harassment.
On this basis, the court concluded that the "service" the clerk had
provided was necessarily "less than that which she might have
provided, had plaintiff been Caucasian." 145 The court stated:
I am persuaded that a jury could find that [the clerk's] conduct
throughout the course of her dealing with plaintiff was
indicative of racial animus, even though that motivation may
have overtly manifested itself only when [she] came after plaintiff
as he was leaving the store. Though she only called plaintiff a
name that any African-American would find deeply offensive
after he had completed his purchases and was about to exit, that
she did so at all is clear and direct proof of bias. It also indicates
that the "service" she provided was less than that which she
might have provided, had plaintiff been Caucasian.146
In this view, just as discrimination while shopping implicates
any eventual purchase, discrimination after purchase alters a
customer's shopping experience in a way that other customers'
experiences are not altered. Browsers' rights are similarly protected
as part of the ongoing contractual interaction between a retailer and
those who enter his or her store. Thus, courts should adopt the
suggestions of Professor Burton and Justice Stevens, follow the
example of Leach, and begin to view retail contracts as ongoing
relationships, rather than a collection of discrete, disaggregated
moments.
Third, in determining the content of retail contracts, courts
should look to Allen v. U.S. Bancorp, 264 F. Supp. 2d 945 (D. Or.
2003), as well as courts' analyses of § 1981 restaurant cases such as
Charity v. Denny's Inc., No. 98-0554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11462 (D.
La. July 27, 1999), McCaleb v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 28 F. Supp.
2d 1043 (D. Ill. 1998), and Perry v. Burger King Corp., 924 F. Supp. 548
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). These courts have properly seen services, in
addition to the goods or food purchased, as integral parts of retail
and restaurant contracts. It is nearly impossible for a customer to
make a purchase without interacting in some way with store
personnel. It is hard, then, to justify courts' interpretation of § 1981
as permitting store staff to provide shoddy service because of a
customer's race or national origin, as long as they ultimately
transact with that customer. Courts should combine their
145. Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911 (D. Ohio 2002).
146. Id.
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broadened view of the statute with a broadened view of the contract
upon which the statute is built, and recognize services as well as
goods as part of the retail bargain.
B. Other Avenues for Relief
As outlined in the introduction, though Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not protect against discrimination in retail
stores, some state and local public accommodations laws do include
retail stores in their coverage. For plaintiffs in those jurisdictions,
state or local law provides an additional avenue for relief.
However, because not all state and local laws provide such
protection, and because many § 1981 contracts-based claims fail,
plaintiffs have turned elsewhere in search of legal redress.
1. Section 1981 Full and Equal Benefits Clause
In addition to bringing claims under the portion of § 1981
concerned with contracts, many plaintiffs who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin in retail
stores have also brought claims under § 1981's other major clause.
This portion of the statute, known as the full and equal benefits
clause, states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens.1 47
At first glance, this clause seems to provide another avenue for
relief for plaintiffs in retail store cases, allowing them to make
claims for deprivations of their liberty by store security guards or
seizure of allegedly stolen goods, for example. However, the
circuits are split over whether the full and equal benefits clause
protects against discrimination by private actors. In Chapman v.
Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit held en banc
that an African-American plaintiff could state a § 1981 full and equal
benefits claim against a private security officer and store manager
who had accused her of shoplifting and searched her person and her
belongings. 148 The court focused on the text of § 1981's subsection
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (emphasis added).
148. Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 828-30 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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(c), which was added by Congress as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 and states, "[t]he rights protected by this section are protected
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State law." 149 According to the Sixth
Circuit, the language of this subsection permits only one
interpretation of the statute: that "section 1981 plainly protects
against impairment of its equal benefit clause by private
discrimination."150
Other circuits have adopted a similar interpretation of the
statute, though not specifically in retail store cases. In Phillip v.
University of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit
held that a plaintiff might succeed on a full and equal benefits claim
against a private actor "without making a traditional state action
showing." 151 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit, even before the 1991
addition of § 1981's subsection (c), allowed a claim of discrimination
under the full and equal benefits clause against private citizens.152
Finally, though the Tenth Circuit has not spoken on the issue, a
Kansas district court has adopted this same approach, refusing to
read a state action requirement into § 1981's full and equal benefits
clause.153
The Eighth Circuit, however, has come to the opposite
conclusion, holding that plaintiffs must make a showing of state
action in order to bring a § 1981 full and equal benefits claim. In
Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001),
the plaintiff brought suit under both clauses of § 1981. The Eighth
Circuit allowed the contract-based claim to proceed, but upheld
dismissal of the plaintiff's full and equal benefits claim, reasoning
that, "[b]ecause the state is the sole source of the law, it is only the
state that can deny the full and equal benefit of the law."154 The
Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have followed suit, stating in
dictum that full and equal benefit claims against private actors
would fail.155 In two district court opinions that specifically address
race discrimination in retail stores, courts have also required state
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c)
150. Chapman, 319 F.3d at 833.
151. Phillip v. University of Rochester, 316 F.3d 291, 292 (2d Cir. 2003)
152. Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1974).
153. Hester v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 (D. Kan. 2005) ("This
court believes that the Tenth Circuit would hold that state action is not required to state
a 'full and equal benefit' claim under section 1981.").
154. Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001)
155. See Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 799 (3d Cir. 2001). See also Jones v.
Poindexter, 903 F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1990); Sheppard v. Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin &
Oshinsky, 59 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 n.1 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Most courts have held that 'the equal
benefits' clause does not extend to private discrimination, and thus, requires state
action.").
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action for a successful § 1981 full and equal benefits clause claim. 5 6
In June 2004, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Sixth
Circuit's Chapman v. Higbee, 542 U.S. 945 (2004), leaving this issue
unresolved. 5 7 At present, the Sixth, Second, Fifth, and perhaps
Tenth Circuits have held that the full and equal benefit clause of §
1981 might provide an additional opportunity for legal redress for
plaintiffs who have been discriminated against in retail stores.158
2. Section 1982 Right to Purchase Personal Property
A potential second avenue for relief for victims of retailers'
discrimination might be 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which guarantees to "all
citizens of the United States" the "same right.., as is enjoyed by
white citizens" to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property." However, as Professor Kennedy
observes, "[s]ection 1982 can be applied to lost contractual rights,
but it is applied no more broadly than Section 1981." 159 Indeed, the
plaintiffs who have brought both § 1981 and § 1982 claims have
found their claims succeeding or failing together. In Shen v. A&P
Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21404 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 7, 1995), the court held that a grocery store's refusal to serve the
plaintiffs violated both § 1981 and § 1982. "[B]ecause of the related
origins and language of the two sections, they are generally
construed in pari materia. [G]roceries constitute personal property
and the refusal to sell groceries is a denial of the right to enter into a
contract." 160 Likewise, in Morris v. Office Max, Inc., the court
dismissed both the plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1982 claims, stating that,
"[b]ecause of their common origin and purpose, § 1981 and § 1982
are generally construed in tandem."161
156. Lewis v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 367, 371 (D. Del. 1996) ("private
defendants, as opposed to state actors, cannot deprive individuals of the full and equal
benefit of all laws"); Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 983 F. Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
("However, the parties did not cite and the court could not find any Seventh Circuit
decisions which hold that the equal benefits clause creates a federal remedy for state law
tort claims where racial animus is alleged. Nor does the court believe that Congress
intended such a remedy.").
157. Chapman v. Higbee, 542 U.S. 945 (2004) (denying cert.).
158. For further analysis of § 1981's full and equal benefits clause, see Simone P.
Wilson, Retailing Racial Profiling: A Case for the Use of the Full and Equal Benefits Clause of
Section 1981 in Consumer Racism Claims, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 123 (2004).
159. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 334.
160. Shen v. A&P Food Stores, No. 93 CV 1184, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21404, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1995).
161. Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Garrett v.
Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[W]e are confident that our reasoning vis-
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However, in one case of retail store discrimination, a court has
analyzed claims under the two statutes separately. In Leach v.
Hyman, the plaintiff won his § 1981 contracts clause claim but lost
his § 1982 claim.162 The court concluded:
[The plaintiff] cannot make out a claim under § 1982, because he
was, regardless of Heyman's racial animus, able to purchase the
items that he had selected. Nothing that he wanted to buy was
withheld from him, or only made available to him on terms and
conditions that differed from the terms and conditions pursuant
to which it was available to others.163
Interestingly, the Leach court adopted an unusually broad view
of the protections of § 1981's contracts clause. In allowing relief
under that statute, however, the court pulled back on § 1982, and
refused to extend that statute's coverage to the limits of the coverage
provided by § 1981.
Thus, § 1982 fails to provide an additional viable option for
plaintiffs who have been discriminated against by retailers, as most
courts interpret § 1982 coextensively with § 1981 in retail store cases.
Commentators have suggested few remaining strategies for such
plaintiffs, among them common law claims, plans for law reform,
and tactics for consumer empowerment.
3. Common Law Claims, Law Reform, and Consumer Empowerment
To plug the holes created by the failure of many § 1981 and §
1982 claims and the scanty coverage of retail stores under state and
local public accommodations laws, Professors Harris and Kennedy
have suggested that plaintiffs bring common law tort claims against
retailers who discriminate. Harris argues that a retailer's detention
of a shopper "on suspicion of shoplifting" gives rise to claims for
false imprisonment and perhaps assault and battery.164 She notes,
however, that these claims are often doomed by laws that permit
retailers, in the name of "protect[ing] their goods," to stop and
search "'in a reasonable manner shoppers reasonably suspected of
shoplifting."" 165 Kennedy adds to the list of available common law
A-vis section 1981 (and, thus, our holding) applies with equal force to any claim that the
appellant might have under section 1982."); Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 764, 777
(N.D. Ill. 1999) ("Courts construe § 1982 as coextensive with § 1981.").
162. Leach v. Heyman, 233 F. Supp. 2d 906, 911 (D. Ohio 2002).
163. Id.
164. Harris, supra note 6, at 18.
165. Id. at 17-18.
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claims defamation, negligent training and supervision, and
negligence.166 Yet she also notes problems with plaintiffs' relying
solely on common law tort claims, observing that "[b]y suppressing
or marginalizing the racial aspect of the claims, reliance on state law
claims perpetuates the belief that profiling customers is an
appropriate means of protecting a business." 167
Given the hurdles that plaintiffs face in attempting to use §
1981, § 1982, and the common law to obtain a remedy for retailers'
discrimination, it is not surprising that commentators have
advanced proposals for law reform. Building on an argument by
Professor Neil Williams, Harris suggests that courts interpret the
common law requirement of good faith and fair dealing in contracts
as prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race. 168 Harris points
out a flaw in this proposal, however, noting that "customers who
were merely browsing in the store could arguably be characterized
as not yet engaged in the formation, performance, enforcement, or
termination of a contract." 169 Indeed, the texts of § 205 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts and §1-203 of the Uniform Commercial
Code concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing both refer
only to the "performance" and "enforcement" of contracts. If courts
interpreting this common law requirement adopt a narrow view of
the duration and content of retail contracts that is similar to the view
adopted by most courts in § 1981 contracts clause cases, the reach of
this proposed common law solution would be quite limited.170 In
addition, it is possible that retailers might discriminate on the basis
of race or national origin in good faith. Such discrimination might
be a response by a non-racist retailer to the racist beliefs of his or her
customers or co-workers. A plaintiff who is discriminated against
might therefore lose if he or she only relies on the common law
166. Kennedy, supra note 11, at 337-38.
167. Id.
168. Harris, supra note 6, at 18-19 ("Professor Neil Williams highlights two federal
opinions from Maine that strongly suggest that race discrimination is inconsistent with
the common law contractual requirements of good faith and fair dealing. Professor
Williams contends that the survival of racial discrimination in contract law advances the
belief that private discrimination is morally acceptable. He advocates changes in
contract law that would 'reflect contemporary society's disdain for racial discrimination'
by prohibiting discrimination in the formation, performance, enforcement, or
termination of a contract.").
169. Id. at 18-19.
170. Though he does not develop this argument at length, Professor Charles Fried
seems to view the requirement of good faith and fair dealing as attaching even before
the contract is formed. "Good faith is a way of dealing with a contractual party:
honestly, decently. It is an adverbial notion suggesting the avoidance of chicanery and
sharp practice (bad faith) whether in coming to an agreement or in carrying out its terms."
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 74
(1981).
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requirement of good faith and fair dealing.' 71
Professor Singer proposes a second way that the common law
of property might be altered to address the problem of
discrimination by retailers. Singer suggests that, under the common
law, once owners of private property convert their property into a
place of public accommodation, they lose their right to exclude. He
explains:
[T]he common-law rule allowing arbitrary exclusion of customers
is based on an illegitimate conception of private property, which
supposes that businesses open to the public are indistinguishable
from private homes. On the contrary, by opening one's property
to the public for business purposes, the owner waives a part of
her right to exclude, since she no longer can claim any legitimate
privacy interests. 72
This change in the common law -the clear grant of the right to
enter retail stores to all shoppers and the elimination of retailers'
right to exclude -would contribute to the elimination of
discrimination within retail stores by making clear that retail stores
are not in any sense "private." By removing this baseline
assumption within the common law, 73 retailers could no longer
justify discrimination on their premises by reference to their status
as owners of private property.
A third law reform proposal comes from Amanda G. Main,
who advocates that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be read to
include retail stores in its coverage. 174 Main argues first that the
statute's list of covered entities should be read as illustrative, rather
than exhaustive. She maintains that "[t]here is no appreciable
distinction between retail stores and other listed places of public
accommodation" because retail stores are as open to the public and
linked to interstate commerce as the listed entities. 175 Echoing
Professor Eskridge's idea of dynamic statutory interpretation,176
Main also proposes that Title II be read in light of later public
accommodations statutes. She points in particular to the Americans
171. Claims under the equitable doctrines of reliance and unjust enrichment might
also be available to plaintiffs who are discriminated against in retail stores. However,
because an analysis of such claims would turn on the individual factual circumstances of
each case, it is omitted from this article.
172. Singer, supra note 9, at 1448.
173. This is the assumption, based on an idea of retailers' right to exclude, that courts'
radical application of § 1981 to "core" retail stores already eliminates, as explained in
Part III.C, supra.
174. Main, supra note 11.
175. Id. at 313.
176. See Eskridge, supra note 130.
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with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which includes retail stores in its
coverage. "In light of Congress' acceptance of a broad list of places
of public accommodation in the ADA, it is reasonable that Congress
would be receptive to a similar list of accommodations in Title II."177
This change in Title II would extend the federal prohibition on race
discrimination in places of public accommodation to retail stores,
and therefore also to those plaintiffs denied protection under § 1981
and other laws.
Professor Regina Austin suggests a final, extra-legal way of
addressing the problem of discrimination on the basis of race or
national origin in retail stores.178  Austin argues that African
Americans should supplement, and perhaps replace, their legal
challenges to retailers' discriminatory practices by "[g]enerating
collective pro-production, pro-distribution sentiments among
blacks... "179 She advocates that African-American shoppers
explore "alternative economic arrangements" and "[build] on the
legacy of a black tradition of mutual aid and communal selfhelp." 180
She offers as an example successful "shopping areas, housing
projects, and credit unions" owned and run by African-American
churches.181
Austin also issues a challenge, urging African Americans to
"embrace the idea that economic resistance is something every black
can engage in every day. Blacks must take on the mantle of outlaws
or bandits, for example, when it comes to passing dollars from one
black hand to the next as many times as possible before the dollars
fall back into the grasp of someone else."' 82 Here, Professor Austin
echoes the now-famous response of Patricia Williams, an African-
American law professor, to a white store clerk's refusal to let her
enter a clothing store:
I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into such
a blizzard of rage. There was almost nothing I could do, short of
physically intruding upon him, that would humiliate him the way
he humiliated me. ... In this weird ontological imbalance, I
realized that buying something in that store was like bestowing a
gift: the gift of my commerce. ... I was quite willing to
disenfranchise myself in the heat of my need to revoke the flattery
of my purchasing power. I was willing to boycott this particular
store, random white-owned businesses, and anyone who blew
177. Main, supra note 11, at 313-14.
178. Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to Shop and to
Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 147 (1994).
179. Id. at 173.
180. Id. at 174.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 176.
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bubble gum in my face again.183
To Professor Austin, and perhaps also Professor Williams, the
law's options for redress for victims of discrimination in retail stores
are shamefully insufficient, and shoppers like Professor Williams,
along with Samaad Bishop and the McCrea family described in the
Introduction, are left with only the options of boycott and self-help.
Conclusion
This article argues that the "right to contract" protected by §
1981 is a process rather than a moment. The statute protects the
entire contractual relationship between customer and a store:
entering, browsing or sampling the goods available, interacting with
store personnel, completing a purchase, and finally exiting the store.
It also argues that stores provide services as well as goods, and §
1981 demands that those services be provided equally to all
customers, regardless of their race or national origin. Finally, it
argues that § 1981 cannot be interpreted both to mandate equal
access and to permit unequal treatment at all points except the
checkout counter. Congress attempted to broaden § 1981 in 1991 to
correct this very mistake in logic, but today's courts have continued
to interpret the statute narrowly and improperly.
Some might respond to the critiques offered in this article, and
to the alternative proposals raised by commentators, by arguing that
the status quo is appropriate, and that the market, unaided by
judicial intervention, will remedy the problem of race discrimination
by retailers. Professor Richard Epstein takes this position in his
attacks on the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.184 Epstein asks, if the prohibition on discrimination in
places of public accommodation were repealed, "[i]s there anyone
who thinks that even one major corporation would adopt a policy of
exclusion on the grounds of race or sex? Or if it did, that it could
profit by that strategy in the marketplace?" 185 Epstein's questions
depend on two related assumptions: that the power of withheld
consumer dollars would force discriminatory retailers out of
business, and that non-discriminating retailers in fact exist as
alternatives for African-American, Latino, and Asian-American
183. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as
the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 128 (1987).
184. Richard Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Ground, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1
(1994).
185. Id. at 28.
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shoppers.
Research summarized by Professor Harris contradicts these
assumptions by revealing the extensive and pervasive nature of race
discrimination in today's market. Harris cites Gallup poll results in
which thirty percent of African-American respondents reported that
they had experienced discrimination while shopping during the last
thirty days, and twenty-one percent had been discriminated against
while dining out.186 In another study by economist Peter Siegelman,
survey evidence places "the probability of discrimination [against
African-American customers] in any given restaurant visit or
shopping trip [at] roughly one to five percent."187 Likewise, a study
of the retail industry by Professors Carol M. Motley of Howard
University and Thomas L. Ainscough of the University of
Wisconsin-Whitewater found that "African Americans wait longer
for customer service than whites of the same gender." 88 Though
surveys and studies are certainly open to criticism, these results at
minimum reveal that race discrimination in retail stores is present
and pervasive, and that Epstein's vision of a market fix is unrealistic
and flawed.
The continued existence of race and national origin
discrimination by retailers and the dearth of options for legal
redress point to the need for courts to correct their flawed § 1981
contracts clause jurisprudence. Courts must cease ignoring the 1991
amendments to the statute, and interpret it broadly, consistent with
canons of statutory interpretation and Congress' goals. They must
correctly analyze a retail contract's duration, adopting a view of a
right to contract that is exercised over the course of the entire
relationship between a customer and a retailer. They must also
consider service as well as goods as part of the bargain between a
customer and a retailer. Each of these changes would bring the
claims of browsers, those customers discriminated against before
purchasing, and those customers discriminated against after
purchasing within the ambit of the statute.
If judges continue to apply § 1981 narrowly, and to build their §
1981 analyses on a correspondingly narrow vision of a retail
contract's duration and content, they will continue to permit race
and national origin discrimination by retailers. Judges will allow
clear-cut race and national origin discrimination to exist in some
protected zone that they deem outside the contractual relationship
and beyond the statute's coverage. "Whites only" signs at stores'
entrances are relegated to our country's past. It is wrong for judges
186. Harris, supra note 6, at 6.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 7.
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today to adopt an interpretation of § 1981 that protects the exercise
of similar discrimination, but within a store's doors. In effect, these
judges are allowing retailers to implement their own "whites only"
policies, providing to white customers only a harassment-free and
discrimination-free shopping experience. In the words of Justice
Brennan, "[o]ne wonders whether [such a judge] still believes that
race discrimination-or, more accurately, race discrimination
against non-whites-is still a problem in our society, or even
remembers that it ever was."' 89
189. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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